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Copyright and Good Faith Purchasers 
Shyamkrishna Balganesh* 
Good faith purchasers for value—individuals who unknowingly 
and in good faith purchase property from a seller whose own actions 
in obtaining the property are of questionable legality—have long 
obtained special protection under the common law. Despite the 
seller’s own actions being tainted, these purchasers obtain valid title 
and are free to transfer the property without restriction. Modern 
copyright law, however, does just the opposite. Individuals who 
unknowingly, and in good faith, purchase property embodying an 
unauthorized copy of a protected work are altogether precluded from 
subsequently alienating such property without running afoul of 
copyright’s distribution right. This Article examines copyright law’s 
anomalous treatment of good faith purchasers and shows how the 
concerns motivating the good faith purchaser doctrine in the common 
law carry over to the principal settings where modern copyright law 
operates. These concerns relate to the free alienability of property 
and the undue informational burdens that consumers might have to 
bear. The Article then develops an analogous doctrine for copyright 
 
  DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.15779/Z38BK2R 
  Copyright © 2016 California Law Review, Inc. California Law Review, Inc. (CLR) is a 
California nonprofit corporation. CLR and the authors are solely responsible for the content of their 
publications. 
 
*  Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. Many thanks to Oren Bracha, 
James Grimmelmann, Amy Kapczynski, Jay Kesan, Irene Lu, Gideon Parchomovsky, Arden Rowell, 
Guy Rub, Melissa Wasserman, and participants in the 2015 NYU Tri-State Intellectual Property 
Workshop, the Illinois IP Colloquium, and faculty workshops at the University of Pennsylvania Law 
School, Hong Kong University Faculty of Law, and Academia Sinica Taiwan for helpful comments 
and suggestions. Simon Burger and Mark Kramer provided excellent research assistance. 
270 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  104:269 
law that would balance the concerns of copyright owners against 
those of innocent consumers. Under this doctrine, good faith 
purchasers for value of objects embodying infringing content would 
obtain good title to such objects as long as they acquire the object 
from its manufacturer before a judicial determination of infringement 
against the manufacturer, i.e., so long as the manufacturer’s title is 
merely voidable and not void. The Article illustrates how this 
doctrine would work in practice and shows how its core elements 
remain compatible with copyright law’s existing analytical structure 
and normative ideals. 
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The triumph of the good faith purchaser has been one of the most 
dramatic episodes in our legal history. 
—Grant Gilmore (1954)
1
 
 
Simply put, there is no such thing as a bona fide purchase for value in 
copyright law. 
—ISC-Bunker Ramo v. Altech, Inc (N.D. Ill. 1990)
2
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The good faith purchaser for value, or good faith purchaser, is a rather 
well-known figure in the modern common law of contract and property.
3
 
Simply stated, the good faith purchaser is an individual who purchases an 
object without knowing that the seller’s interest in that object is legally tainted 
in some way.
4
 Rather than penalizing an innocent buyer in such situations, the 
common law developed the good faith purchaser doctrine to protect the buyer 
who had no knowledge of the underlying taint. So long as the purchase was 
made in good faith the buyer would obtain a fully valid interest in the object, 
one that could be further transferred without impediment.
5
 Once the good faith 
purchaser obtained good title, he was thereafter empowered to transfer it to 
others freely without having to worry about the validity of the various transfers. 
The common law achieved this by treating the seller’s tainted interest as a 
voidable title that could be freely transferred to the good faith purchaser at any 
time until a court repudiated it.
6
 Central to the idea of voidable title was the 
common law’s desire to maintain the free alienability of movables by 
minimizing the informational burdens on potential buyers, which could serve to 
deter their very interest in acquiring the object. 
 
 1. Grant Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.J. 1057, 
1057 (1954). 
 2. 765 F. Supp. 1310, 1331 (N.D. Ill. 1990). 
 3. For some of the leading work describing the idea, see J. WALTER JONES, THE POSITION 
AND RIGHTS OF A BONA FIDE PURCHASER FOR VALUE OF GOODS IMPROPERLY OBTAINED (1921); 
James Barr Ames, Purchase for Value Without Notice, 1 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1887); Calvin W. Corman, 
Cash Sales, Worthless Checks and the Bona Fide Purchaser, 10 VAND. L. REV. 55 (1956); Gilmore, 
supra note 1; Grant Gilmore, The Good Faith Purchase Idea and the Uniform Commercial Code: 
Confessions of a Repentant Draftsman, 15 GA. L. REV. 605 (1981) [hereinafter Gilmore, Confessions]; 
Saul Levmore, Variety and Uniformity in the Treatment of the Good-Faith Purchaser, 16 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 43 (1987); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Rethinking the Laws of Good Faith Purchase, 111 
COLUM. L. REV. 1332 (2011); Edward M. Swartz, The Bona Fide Purchaser Revisited: A 
Comparative Inquiry, 42 B.U. L. REV. 403 (1962). 
 4. See U.C.C. § 2-403 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1989) (dealing with good 
faith purchases). 
 5. See id.; Gilmore, supra note 1, at 1058–60. 
 6. Gilmore, supra note 1, at 1059; see also Gilmore, Confessions, supra note 3, at 609. 
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While the good faith purchaser doctrine has its origins in the law relating 
to the sale of goods, it moved in due course to a host of other areas involving 
analogous commercial transactions: negotiable instruments, corporate 
securities, bonds, and, eventually, even land purchases.
7
 By the mid-twentieth 
century, the expansion of the doctrine and its underlying rationale prompted 
Grant Gilmore to famously conclude that “[t]he triumph of the good faith 
purchaser has been one of the most dramatic episodes of our legal history.”
8
 
While the doctrine has met with intermittent objection and criticism over the 
years, it continues to be routinely invoked and applied in almost all common 
law jurisdictions. 
Given the long and exalted history of the doctrine in the common law,
9
 it 
is altogether surprising that modern copyright law not only offers good faith 
purchasers absolutely no protection but also subjects them to potential liability. 
Under current copyright law, when a buyer acquires an object containing 
copyrighted expression, they must ensure that their use of such expression in 
the object is a noninfringing, authorized use. If it turns out that despite the 
buyer’s best efforts to ascertain this, the object does in fact contain infringing 
expression, copyright law severely curtails the buyer’s ownership rights in the 
object. The innocent buyer in such a situation is precluded from transferring the 
object to other members of the public, since such a transfer would violate the 
copyright owner’s distribution right.
10
 Additionally, if the buyer learns of the 
infringing content at the time of the attempted sale, even if this was unknown at 
the time of the purchase, the buyer—even though he was a good faith 
purchaser—could be prosecuted for criminal copyright infringement.
11
 In 
effect, copyright law treats a good faith purchaser’s ownership over an object 
embodying infringing content as fundamentally inalienable. The condition of 
inalienability effectively operates as an equitable servitude on the purchaser’s 
title to the object.
12
 
To be sure, it is hardly the case that copyright law consciously conflates 
the ownership of copyright with the ownership of the physical object that 
contains the copyrighted work. To the contrary, copyright law has long cared 
about separating the two, both analytically and functionally.
13
 Its principal 
 
 7. Gilmore, supra note 1, at 1063–77; 3 HERBERT THORNDIKE TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL 
PROPERTY 2284 (3d ed. 1939). 
 8. Gilmore, supra note 1, at 1057. 
 9. For an excellent historical account of the development of the doctrine, see Harold R. 
Weinberg, Markets Overt, Voidable Titles, and Feckless Agents: Judges and Efficiency in the 
Antebellum Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 56 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1981). 
 10. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2012). 
 11. Id. § 506(a) (detailing requirements for criminal liability for copyright infringement). 
 12. See Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Equitable Servitudes on Chattels, 41 HARV. L. REV. 945 
(1928). 
 13. 17 U.S.C. § 202 expressly provides: 
Ownership of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights under a copyright, is 
distinct from ownership of any material object in which the work is embodied. 
2016] COPYRIGHT AND GOOD FAITH PURCHASERS 273 
device for separating the ownership of copyrighted expression from the 
ownership of the object is the first sale doctrine.
14
 Originally the creation of 
courts, the first sale doctrine allows the owner of a physical object that 
embodies copyrighted content to sell that object without incurring liability for 
copyright infringement. However, for the doctrine to apply, the law demands 
that the “first” sale of the content be authorized, or legal.
15
 In other words, in 
situations where the first sale was itself an infringement, the law precludes the 
purchaser from selling the object. In essence, copyright’s first sale doctrine 
directly rejects protecting the good faith purchaser’s title. 
In addition, since the early twentieth century, U.S. copyright law has 
consciously treated copyright infringement as a strict liability tort, specifically 
eliminating all protection for “innocent sellers” of infringing products.
16
 Based 
on the argument that such an exception would hurt the interests of copyright 
owners and present courts with insurmountable evidentiary problems, 
copyright law today treats an infringer’s intent or good faith as altogether 
irrelevant to the question of liability.
17
 Together with the inapplicability of the 
first sale doctrine to such purchases, courts therefore readily accept the reality 
that “there is no such thing as a bona fide purchase for value in copyright law” 
today.
18
 Indeed, this reality is routinely treated as altogether uncontroversial. 
Unlike in the common law, which exempts the good faith purchaser from 
bearing the burden of the seller’s unlawful behavior, copyright law forces the 
good faith purchaser to be vigilant about a seller’s use of protected expression 
when buying the object. If the purchaser fails to detect the seller’s unlawful 
(i.e., infringing) behavior—even after making all possible efforts—his title 
over the object becomes functionally defective. Caveat emptor, or “buyer, 
beware!” remains copyright law’s emphasis, even though the law in all other 
fields has turned away from this emphasis and in favor of consumer 
protection.
19
 
 
Transfer of ownership of any material object, including the copy or phonorecord in 
which the work is first fixed, does not of itself convey any rights in the copyrighted 
work embodied in the object; nor, in the absence of an agreement, does transfer of 
ownership of a copyright or of any exclusive rights under a copyright convey 
property rights in any material object. 
 14. The doctrine has been codified. See id. § 109; see also 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID 
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.12 (Matthew Bender rev. ed. 2015). 
 15. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) provides that “[n]otwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3), the 
owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title . . . is entitled, without the 
authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or 
phonorecord.” (emphasis added). 
 16. See R. Anthony Reese, Innocent Infringement in U.S. Copyright Law: A History, 30 
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 133 (2007). 
 17. 4 NIMMER, supra note 14, § 13.08[B][1]. 
 18. See, e.g., ISC-Bunker Ramo Corp. v. Altech, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 1310, 1331 (N.D. Ill. 
1990) (citation omitted). 
 19. See generally Walton H. Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE L.J. 
1133 (1931). 
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Copyright law’s failure to protect good faith purchasers carries with it 
very important practical consequences. With advancements in technology and 
manufacturing, the number of physical consumer goods that contain 
copyrighted expression has grown exponentially in the last few decades. As a 
recent Supreme Court decision noted, in today’s marketplace, “‘automobiles, 
microwaves, calculators, mobile phones, tablets, and personal computers’ 
contain copyrightable software programs or packaging . . .” and innumerable 
other consumer products “bear, carry, or contain copyrighted ‘packaging, 
logos, labels, and product inserts and instructions for [the use of] everyday 
packaged goods.’”
20
 Requiring consumers to ascertain whether the products 
they regularly purchase contain any infringing content or expression would 
place an enormous informational burden on consumers—precisely the type of 
burden that the good faith purchaser doctrine was developed to avoid. 
For one, much of this expression is usually concealed and technical in 
nature (e.g., software code in an electronic device). Additionally, determining 
whether something is infringing is no easy task. It necessitates determining 
whether the expression was protectable under copyright law, whether it was 
copied from another protected work, whether it was “substantially similar” to 
the work from which it was copied, and whether such copying might indeed be 
lawful because of copyright law’s several exceptions and limitations.
21
 Lastly, 
given how long the term of protection is for copyright (i.e., the life of the 
author plus 70 years or 120 years from the date of creation),
22
 an infringement 
could be determined several years after the creation of the work. A purchaser’s 
title might thus come to be tainted decades after the initial purchase. In light of 
these far-reaching realities, it is somewhat bewildering that copyright’s 
omission to accord a good faith purchaser any protection has received such 
little scrutiny and discussion—among courts, scholars, and policymakers. 
Consider the following scenario, which illustrates this anomaly and, 
indeed, its ubiquity. Joe is looking to buy a used car. One morning, he comes 
across Frank’s Craigslist advertisement offering to sell his 2008 Honda Civic 
for $15,000. Joe meets Frank, inspects the vehicle, takes it for a test drive, and 
agrees to buy the car. Frank tells Joe that he has had the car for less than a 
month and is selling it because he has been forced to relocate. Joe verifies all 
the documentation associated with the vehicle (registration, title, etc.), pays 
Frank in cash, and drives away. 
 
 20. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1365 (2013) (citation omitted). 
 21. For a good overview of copyright law’s uncertainty and the normative proposals 
associated with this phenomenon, see Steven J. Horowitz, Copyright’s Asymmetric Uncertainty, 79 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 331, 337–55 (2012). 
 22. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a), (c) (2012) (providing that the copyright term “endures for a term 
consisting of the life of the author and 70 years after the author’s death” or, in the case of anonymous 
works, pseudonymous works, or works made for hire, for “a term of 120 years from the year of its 
creation”). 
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Unbeknownst to Joe, Frank had obtained the car from a local car dealer a 
few days earlier by impersonating an employee and writing a forged check. It 
takes the car dealership a week or so to discover Frank’s trickery (i.e., 
impersonation), by which time Joe has purchased the vehicle from Frank and is 
in possession of it. Under the common law, the car dealership cannot recover 
the vehicle from Joe. Joe is a good faith purchaser for value, who obtains 
perfect title and is protected. Frank’s title was voidable—and since the 
dealership did not avoid it before the transfer to Joe—the law protects Joe’s 
ownership.
23
 A few months later, when Joe wants to sell the vehicle to Cindy, 
who he finds on a website for used cars, he is therefore at complete liberty to 
do so, and Cindy too obtains perfect ownership of the car. The car remains 
freely transferable in the marketplace, with no constraints. 
Now consider the following twist. A few months after Joe buys the car 
from Frank, a federal court finds that Honda committed copyright infringement 
by using Toyota’s software code in the engine maintenance module of all 
Honda Civics manufactured after 2007. Joe gets good faith purchaser 
protection at common law, which protects him against Frank’s fraud in 
procuring the car. However, Joe’s ownership is nonetheless severely emaciated, 
because copyright law disallows him from selling, renting, leasing, or 
otherwise transferring the vehicle to the public, by treating such an act as a 
violation of the copyright owner’s (i.e., Toyota’s) distribution right.
24
 If Joe 
sells the car to Cindy—even without their knowing about Honda’s 
infringement at the time of the sale—Toyota could bring a claim for copyright 
infringement against him, seeking an injunction, statutory damages, or both. In 
effect, copyright law forces Joe to hold on to the $15,000 car for the duration of 
Toyota’s copyright: 120 years! Joe’s ownership interest, while protected by the 
common law, is thus eviscerated as a functional matter by current copyright 
law. 
In this Article, I examine this surprising anomaly within copyright law. A 
close examination of the reasons behind the development of the common law’s 
good faith purchaser doctrine reveals that they remain of equal, if not greater, 
applicability in the primary domains where consumers interact with copyright 
law in the modern context. This fact is only compounded by copyright law’s 
rather fundamental dependence on litigation to determine the existence and 
scope of an infringement. Based on this reality, and the recognition that 
Congress consciously chose to do away with any exception to liability for all 
innocent infringers, the Article suggests a position that distributes the burdens 
 
 23. For an actual case with a nearly identical fact pattern where the court came to the same 
conclusion, see Marlow v. Conley, 787 N.E.2d 490 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (concluding that an innocent 
buyer who purchased a vehicle from a seller who had defrauded the original owner was protected 
against the owner’s claim, since the buyer had obtained the certificate of title from the seller). 
 24. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(3). 
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of infringement equally between copyright owners and good faith purchasers 
through the recognition of a good faith purchaser doctrine in copyright law. 
Building on the centrality of adjudication to the question of infringement, 
as well as on the underappreciated reality that copyright’s distribution right is 
analytically dependent on the reproduction right, a good faith purchaser 
doctrine for copyright would work in four important ways. First, anyone who 
makes an unauthorized reproduction of the work and embodies that 
reproduction into a chattel should be treated as having “voidable” (rather than 
void) title to the chattel until a final judicial determination of infringement is 
made against that person, at which time the title should be considered to have 
been avoided, i.e., rendered void as a result of that determination. Second, a 
good faith purchaser for value of that chattel from a seller with voidable title 
would obtain good title to that chattel, provided of course that the transfer 
(from the seller with voidable title) occurred prior to the determination of 
infringement. Third, the good faith purchaser would remain free to transfer the 
chattel—without risk of infringement—to others on the market without 
triggering potential liability for copyright infringement. Fourth, subsequent 
purchasers from a good faith purchaser would also obtain good title to the 
chattel, and remain able to further alienate it on the market without liability.
25
 
Good faith purchaser protection of this kind in copyright law is unlikely to 
interfere seriously with a copyright owner’s legitimate interests. While each 
subsequent transfer is, technically speaking, a violation of the distribution right 
under current law, it nonetheless derives—as a causal matter—from a unitary 
wrongful act: the production of infringing content and its incorporation into an 
object, which amounts to an unauthorized reproduction, i.e., an infringement of 
the reproduction right by the producer of the object. Since the copyright owner 
will have the ability to go after the original wrongdoer for harm arising from 
that infringement, denying the owner equivalent claims against every 
subsequent transferee or consumer who attempts to resell the item does no 
harm to the copyright owner’s interests, and at the same time greatly promotes 
the marketability of the object involved. 
The Article unfolds in three parts. Part I begins by briefly setting out the 
basics of good faith purchaser protection at common law. It traces the origins 
of the doctrine and examines the primary motivations and considerations that 
went into the construction of the doctrine, both in its historical and modern 
forms. Part II then focuses on the puzzle that is at the heart of the paper: 
copyright law’s anomalous treatment of the good faith purchaser and its 
attempts to impose liability on such purchasers. It begins by examining modern 
copyright law’s treatment of good faith purchasers and then walks through the 
 
 25. And they would, in turn, obtain identical protection. This rule is known as the “shelter 
rule” in the law relating to good faith purchasers. See Menachem Mautner, “The Eternal Triangles of 
the Law”: Toward a Theory of Priorities in Conflicts Involving Remote Parties, 90 MICH. L. REV. 95, 
97–99 (1991). 
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historical reasons for copyright’s omission of such protection to show how 
copyright law’s purported rationale for the omission is premised on a 
fundamental non sequitur. It then argues that most of the reasons offered for 
good faith purchaser protection in the common law readily carry over to 
copyright law, where the realities of technological development and the 
modular nature of goods exacerbate the informational burdens placed on 
innocent purchasers. Finally, Part III argues for the creation of a good faith 
purchaser doctrine in copyright law. In so doing, it first draws on the analytical 
logic embedded within the working of copyright’s distribution right, the first 
sale doctrine, and the copyright statute’s remedial measures relating to 
“infringing articles.” It then discusses what good faith purchaser protection 
would look like in copyright law, and draws out the principal consequences 
that would flow from such protection for innocent purchasers and for third 
parties acquiring infringing articles from them. 
I. 
GOOD FAITH PURCHASERS FOR VALUE 
Before getting at the anomaly that lies at the heart of this Article, namely 
the divergence of copyright law and the common law on the protection 
afforded to good faith purchasers, this Part provides a brief overview of the 
basic ideas, concepts, and motivations underlying such protection at common 
law. It looks at some of the history behind the doctrine and how the doctrine 
has come to be extended and applied in the modern context, all of which 
remains directly relevant to understanding the puzzling nature of copyright 
law’s omission of similar protection. 
A. Origins in the Common Law 
As a historical matter, the origins of the good faith purchaser doctrine in 
English common law are usually traced back to the sixteenth century, when it 
began to take shape under a largely analogous doctrine referred to as “market 
overt.”
26
 The market overt doctrine sought to protect purchasers who bought 
their goods from sellers in “open” fairs and markets, which formed the 
principal channel for trade during the time.
27
 Since these markets were open 
and visible to the public at large, the seller was thought to be signaling publicly 
about the existence of an ostensible authority to transfer the goods in question. 
The innocent purchaser who relied on this authority was believed to be worthy 
 
 26. See JONES, supra note 3, at 33; Daniel E. Murray, Sale in Market Overt, 9 INT’L & COMP. 
L.Q. 24 (1960); J.G. Pease, Market Overt in the City of London, 31 LAW Q. REV. 270 (1915); J.G. 
Pease, The Change of the Property in Goods by Sale in Market Overt, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 375 (1908); 
Peter M. Smith, Valediction to Market Overt, 41 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 225 (1997). 
 27. JONES, supra note 3, at 38–39 (describing the contours of such fairs and markets where the 
rule applied, and observing that the “market must be a legally constituted one”); see also Smith, supra 
note 26, at 235–42 (detailing the requirements of the doctrine). 
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of protection to ensure that buyers weren’t altogether dissuaded by the 
likelihood of losing their purchased items despite their reliance on the seller’s 
deception, which could in turn cause commerce to suffer. Sir William 
Blackstone provides an early description of the doctrine and its rationale: 
But property may also in some cases be transferred by sale, though the 
vendor has none at all in the goods; for it is expedient that the buyer, 
by taking proper precautions, may at all events be secure of his 
purchase; otherwise all commerce between man and man must soon be 
at an end. And therefore the general rule of law is, that all sales and 
contracts of any thing vendible, in fairs or markets overt (that is, open), 
shall not only be good between the parties, but also be binding on all 
those that have any right or property therein. . . . By which wise 
regulations the common law has secured the right of the proprietor in 
personal chattels from being d[i]vested, so far as was consistent with 
that other necessary policy, that purchasers, bona fide, in a fair, open, 
and regular manner, should not be afterwards put to difficulties by 
reason of the previous knavery of the seller.
28
 
Similar descriptions of the doctrine and its purpose are found in Coke’s 
Institutes.
29
 In simple terms, the market overt doctrine allowed a good faith 
purchaser (the “bona fide” purchaser) who purchased an item in customary fair 
or market, with no knowledge of the seller’s deception, and through an arm’s 
length transaction, to be secure of his ownership interest in the item, i.e., to 
obtain good title even against the original owner of the item. The only 
exception to this general rule was in relation to “stolen” property, with the 
understanding that a thief could never transfer good title to another.
30
 
The market overt doctrine represented an early modification of the rule 
nemo dat quod non habet, or “one cannot give that which one does not have.”
31
 
Notably, the early form of the doctrine described the situation in largely binary 
terms. Either the good faith purchaser obtained no title—as in cases of theft—
or the good faith purchaser obtained perfect title, leaving the original owner 
with no recourse whatsoever. Central to the doctrine was therefore the 
recognition that commerce necessitated such clear title (or lack thereof) as a 
direct incentive. In recognizing the role of such fairs and markets in commerce 
and the idea that they were a source of great sustenance for communities, Coke 
thus observed in no uncertain terms that through the market overt doctrine “the 
common law did ordain (to encourage men thereunto).”
32
 By the late nineteenth 
 
 28. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *450–51. 
 29. See 2 EDWARD COKE, THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 713 (W. Clarke & 
Sons ed., 1809) (1642). 
 30. See 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 28, at *448 (“But if my goods are stolen from me, and 
sold, out of market overt, my property is not altered, and I may take them wherever I find them.”). 
 31. Henry E. Smith, On the Economy of Concepts in Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2097, 2120 
(2012). A variant of this maxim is the statement “nemo plus juris ad alium transferre potest quam ipse 
habet.” JONES, supra note 3, at 4; Smith, supra note 26, at 225 n.4. 
 32. 2 COKE, supra note 29, at 713. 
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century, the common law doctrine of market overt came to be codified in 
England.
33
 
When the market overt doctrine crossed the Atlantic and made its way to 
the American colonies, however, American common law courts were at first 
somewhat skeptical of its consequences and of the claim that the doctrine was 
essential to commerce.
34
 Particularly important in this skepticism appears to 
have been the binary approach that the early common law adopted, which 
required courts to choose between declaring the purchaser’s title absolutely 
invalid and declaring it to be perfectly valid. In addition, the very idea of 
customary, regulated markets and fairs—which drew from English customary 
practice—seems to have found few parallels in the colonies.
35
 By the 
nineteenth century this began to change, and courts became more open to 
protecting the good faith purchaser, now quite independent of markets overt.
36
 
As some historians have pointed out, changes in the American economy 
“increased the impersonality of commercial activity,” which enhanced the risks 
placed on good faith purchasers.
37
 Thus emerged the concept of voidable title, 
which enabled courts to avoid conceptualizing good faith purchaser protection 
in purely binary terms. Under the voidable title idea, a seller whose interest in 
the good was tainted in some way could pass on perfect title to a good faith 
purchaser for value, as long as the original owner had not avoided that seller’s 
title altogether through a legal action prior to the sale to the good faith 
purchaser. In this approach, the seller’s title was treated as neither perfect nor 
altogether nonexistent, but as voidable, meaning that it could be set aside by 
bringing a legal action. Yet, until such avoidance it was capable of functioning 
as perfectly valid. The idea drew from contract law, which has for long 
maintained a distinction between void agreements and voidable contracts.
38
 
American courts, it would appear, came to recognize the undue burden that a 
rule of no title would place on good faith purchasers by relegating to them the 
costs of investigating title during each transaction, thereby impeding the 
efficient functioning of markets. One nineteenth-century court thus observed, 
 
 33. Sale of Goods Act 1893, 56 & 57 Vict. c. 71, § 22(1) (Eng.). The section reads: “Where 
goods are sold in market overt, according to the usage of the market, the buyer acquires a good title to 
the goods, provided he buys them in good faith and without notice of any defect or want of title on the 
part of the seller.” Id. 
 34. See Weinberg, supra note 9, at 7 (observing that the doctrine was rejected and disapproved 
by courts in Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, New York, Maryland, Vermont, Ohio, Indiana, Kentucky, 
and Virginia, by the middle of the nineteenth century). 
 35. See, e.g., Heacock v. Walker, 1 Tyl. 338, 341 (Vt. 1802) (“[I]n this State we have no such 
city customs; no prescriptive rights to vend particular articles in particular places; no fairs or statute 
markets.”). 
 36. Weinberg, supra note 9, at 16–17. 
 37. Id. at 16. 
 38. See FREDERICK POLLOCK, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT AT LAW AND IN EQUITY 7 (3d ed. 
1906) (“A voidable act . . . takes its full and proper legal effect unless and until it is disputed and set 
aside by some person entitled so to do.”). 
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after applying the doctrine to find for a good faith purchaser, that “[a] contrary 
principle would endanger the security of commercial transactions, and destroy 
that confidence upon which what is called the usual course of trade materially 
rests.”
39
 
Thus emerged the modern doctrine of the good faith purchaser in 
American law. In 1906, the Uniform Sales Act codified the doctrine for the 
first time, by providing that “[w]here the seller of goods has a voidable title 
thereto, but his title has not been avoided at the time of the sale, the buyer 
acquires a good title to the goods, provided he buys them in good faith, for 
value, and without notice of the seller’s defect of title.”
40
 A few years later, the 
Uniform Commercial Code replaced the Uniform Sales Act, and a majority of 
states adopted it as their law. Section 2-403 of the Code explicitly recognizes 
the good faith purchaser doctrine and reiterates its nonbinary nature by relying 
on the idea of voidable title.
41
 In situations where an individual obtains goods 
from another (the original owner) through deception, a dishonored check, 
fraud, or the like, the law treats that individual’s title as facially voidable, 
allowing her to transfer good title to a “good faith purchaser for value.”
42
 The 
original owner, i.e., the victim of the deception or the recipient of the bad 
check, can nonetheless prevent this if she succeeds in converting the deceiver’s 
voidable title into a void title prior to the sale to the good faith purchaser. 
B. Modern Common Law Protection 
As currently understood, the good faith purchaser doctrine embodies three 
distinct elements: (1) the purchaser’s good faith; (2) the transaction being a sale 
for value; and (3) the seller’s title being voidable as a legal matter. Each of 
these elements deserves elaboration here since a good faith purchaser doctrine 
for copyright law might usefully retain many of these basic ideas. 
1. Good Faith 
The precise meaning of “good faith,” at least insofar as it is applied to the 
good faith purchaser doctrine, has varied over time. Early on in the 
development of the doctrine, the idea was treated as synonymous with “absence 
of knowledge” on the part of the purchaser.
43
 It was hardly a conduit through 
which to examine the purchaser’s state of mind. An alternation seems to have 
emerged only when the doctrine began moving to the context of negotiable 
instruments and commercial paper.
44
 Around this time, cases arose where 
 
 39. Root v. French, 13 Wend. 570, 572 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1835). 
 40. UNIF. SALES ACT § 24, U.L.A. app. I (1906). 
 41. U.C.C. § 2-403 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1989). 
 42. Id. § 2-403(1). 
 43. JONES, supra note 3, at 14–15. 
 44. Id. at 15 (observing that the idea “began to be more fully discussed, as something different 
from mere absence of knowledge, when negotiable instruments became common”). 
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courts began asking whether the purchaser had acquired the goods “in the usual 
course of business,”
45
 and whether the purchaser had “asked all those questions 
which . . . a party ought to ask.”
46
 Thus developed the objective approach to 
good faith, wherein courts asked whether the purchaser had behaved in a way 
that a reasonably prudent person would have behaved under the 
circumstances.
47
 Shortly thereafter, courts grew uncomfortable with the 
objective approach and reverted back to a subjective one, suggesting that no 
amount of negligence on the part of the purchaser could deprive them of 
protection under the doctrine.
48
 As the law moved to the United States, 
American courts seemed fairly reluctant to embrace an objective standard. 
Commentators confirm that a more subjective standard prevailed, under which 
the purchaser’s “actual behavior” was the focus of the investigation.
49
 This is 
supposedly captured in observations such as: “suspicious circumstances 
sufficient to put a prudent man on inquiry . . . are not sufficient of themselves 
to prevent recovery.”
50
 Over time, the law appears to have oscillated between 
objective and subjective versions of the test. 
“Good faith” was finally defined by the codification of the doctrine in the 
Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.). In the current definition, the codifiers 
appear to have adopted an objective approach to the definition by providing 
that good faith “means honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable 
commercial standards of fair dealing.”
51
 Much of the work in this definition is 
done by the idea of “fair dealing,” which is in turn meant to be understood 
contextually and as connected to “fairness of conduct,” rather than the specific 
level of care exercised. Consequently, the good faith purchaser merely needs to 
comply with reasonable commercial standards, not in some abstract sense, but 
as they relate to fair dealing.
52
 Or, as one commentary puts it, “[t]he issue is 
one of ‘unfairness’ not of ‘negligence,’” which appears to have produced some 
confusion among courts.
53
 
 
 45. Miller v. Race (1758) 97 Eng. Rep. 398 (KB) 402 (internal quotations omitted). 
 46. Gill v. Cubitt (1824) 107 Eng. Rep. 806 (KB) 809. 
 47. See JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 707 (6th ed. 
2010). 
 48. See, e.g., Goodman v. Harvey (1836) 111 Eng. Rep. 1011 (KB); Crook v. Jadis (1834) 110 
Eng. Rep. 1028 (KB). For an excellent overview of this movement in the law, see Neil O. Littlefield, 
Good Faith Purchase of Consumer Paper: The Failure of the Subjective Test, 39 S. CAL. L. REV. 48, 
50–52 (1966). 
 49. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 47, at 707–08. 
 50. Id. at 707 n.2. (citing F. BEUTEL, BEUTEL’S BRANNON NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW 
772–74 (7th ed. 1948)). 
 51. U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(20) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2011) (emphasis added). 
Absent the reasonableness language in the section, the definition could be, and indeed was, understood 
as embodying the subjective approach. For an excellent overview of the controversy and opposition 
surrounding the Code’s adoption of the objective approach in the definition, see Littlefield, supra note 
48, at 57–59. 
 52. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 47, at 709. 
 53. Id. 
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As the doctrine is currently understood, the good faith requirement entails 
an assessment of the buyer’s behavior at the time of the purchase. It is perhaps 
overly simplistic to try and characterize its working in binary terms, as either 
subjective or objective.
54
 The assessment is heavily contextual and often times 
looks to multiple aspects of the transaction to examine whether the buyer’s 
behavior was reasonable under the circumstances. Thus, courts have held that 
when a buyer purchases a chattel, such as a car, without complying with the 
ordinary process through which such chattel is normally acquired in the market 
(e.g., title and deed), these circumstances ought to have raised sufficient 
suspicion, meaning that the buyer cannot be said to have acted in good faith.
55
 
Another common circumstance is where the buyer obtains an item for a price 
that is dramatically lower than its ordinary market value. This too has caused 
courts to conclude that the purchaser did not act in good faith.
56
 Despite these 
emerging patterns, the leading commentary on the U.C.C. “caution[s] anyone 
who is confident about the meaning of good faith to reconsider.”
57
 
2. Value 
The good faith purchaser must be a purchaser for value. On its face, this 
suggests that valuable consideration must have moved from the purchaser to 
the seller in return for the item and title over it. Early English decisions insisted 
that the consideration be “valuable” as opposed to merely good or meritorious, 
implying that some detriment on the part of the purchaser needed to be shown 
for it to qualify.
58
 Modern American law takes a much simpler position, and the 
U.C.C. today defines “value” in extremely broad terms.
59
 It includes “any 
consideration” that would qualify to support a simple contract, thereby 
outsourcing the determination to state contract laws, which tend to adopt much 
less exacting standards than English law.
60
 Additionally, it also includes 
situations where the purchaser accepts delivery under a prior contract for 
purchase, and covers the acceptance of something for a preexisting claim, 
thereby making clear that debts can amount to consideration, an issue that early 
on had divided courts.
61
 As noted previously, the question of value is hardly 
ever a contested issue during the application of the good faith purchaser 
 
 54. For an early argument along these lines, see Littlefield, supra note 48, at 50 (suggesting 
that the dichotomy emerged mostly out of “convenience”). 
 55. See, e.g., Ellsworth v. Worthey, 612 S.W.2d 396 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981). 
 56. See, e.g., Kotis v. Nowlin Jewelry, Inc., 844 S.W.2d 920 (Tex. App. 1992). 
 57. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 47, at 201. 
 58. JONES, supra note 3, at 25 & n.9. 
 59. See U.C.C. § 1-204 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1989) (defining “value”). The 
leading commentary on the subject notes that “[a]lmost any purchaser . . . except a donee, gives value” 
under the definition. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 47, at 200. 
 60. See U.C.C. § 1-204(4). For the standard under English law, see JONES, supra note 3, at 25 
(observing how early English law emphasized “money consideration”). 
 61. U.C.C. § 1-204(2), (3); see JONES, supra note 3, at 27 (“[A] pre-existing debt is not, in 
itself, sufficient to support a simple contract.”). 
2016] COPYRIGHT AND GOOD FAITH PURCHASERS 283 
doctrine (as long as there was a commercial transaction), and it comes up only 
indirectly as a factor during the assessment of the purchaser’s good faith. 
3. Voidable Title 
A critical component of the good faith purchaser doctrine at common law 
is the idea of “voidable title.”
62
 Voidable title came to signify the existence of a 
potentially actionable taint on the seller’s title that required legal action on the 
part of the owner in order to attach. Voidable title is thus a situation where the 
law recognizes a holder as having “legal title but his transferor has the right to 
avoid the transfer and reassert title in himself.”
63
 Voidable title came to be 
contrasted with “void title,” representing situations where the law—as a matter 
of public policy—demanded no further action on the part of the owner for the 
taint to attach.
64
 In these situations, the taint was considered significant and 
injurious enough that the law refused to find any legal title in the holder. 
Paradigmatic of such void title is a seller’s possession of goods obtained 
through theft.
65
 The law views the crime of theft as sufficiently harmful and 
worthy of condemnation that it attaches the taint to the seller’s possession right 
away, without the need for any action on the part of the owner for the taint to 
attach. To this day, possession through theft remains the primary, and perhaps 
only, instance of void title at common law, one that is incapable of protecting a 
good faith purchaser. It is important to note that it is not just the involvement of 
criminal law that renders title void, since innumerable types of fraud and 
trickery that are punishable as crimes are all perfectly capable of generating 
voidable title despite their being classified as crimes by the law.
66
 
The law’s distinction between void and voidable title therefore hinges on 
two independent analytical variables. The first is the perceived gravity of the 
taint in issue, and whether the law’s condemnation of the taint-generating 
behavior overwhelms the need to provide good faith purchasers with any form 
of protection. The understanding that theft—as opposed to other property 
crimes—operates as an intrinsic wrong, i.e., malum in se, lies at the root of this 
 
 62. See 92A C.J.S. Vendor and Purchaser § 581 (2014); Charles M. Weber, The Extension of 
the Voidable Title Principle Under the Code, 49 KY. L.J. 437 (1961). 
 63. Weber, supra note 62, at 439. 
 64. See 10 MATTHEW BACON, A NEW ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAW 374 (Phila. 1846) (“A 
thing is void which was done against law at the very time of doing it, and no person is bound by such 
an act; but a thing is only voidable which is done by a person who ought not to have done it, but who 
nevertheless cannot avoid it himself after it is done; though it may by some act in law be made void.”). 
For the rationale here, see 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 28, at *145 (“[I]f an acquisition of goods by 
either force or fraud were allowed to be a sufficient title, all property would soon be confined to the 
most strong, or the most cunning.”). 
 65. See, e.g., O’Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 868 (N.J. 1980); Stevens v. Hyde, 32 Barb. 
171, 1860 WL 7506 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1860). 
 66. See U.C.C. § 2-403(1)(d) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002). 
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idea.
67
 The second is the ease, certainty, and directness with which the very 
existence of the taint can be ascertained. Where the illegality directly impacts 
the transaction on its very face, such as when the transaction is prima facie 
nonconsensual (e.g., a direct theft), the law is ready and willing to treat the 
possessor’s title as altogether void. By contrast, when the illegality requires 
proof of additional facts, the law treats the title that passes as voidable. Here, 
the technical nature of the criminality is seen as serving alternative goals that 
do not implicate protection of good faith purchasers. We see this logic at play 
in the U.C.C.’s good faith purchaser provision, where the drafters were acutely 
aware that “larceny” had expanded to include offenses that went well beyond 
the traditional idea of a mere unlawful taking, i.e., a theft.
68
 In choosing to treat 
such expanded forms of larceny as generating voidable rather than void title, 
the drafters noted that the good faith purchaser doctrine is “freed from any 
technicalities depending on the extended law of larceny.”
69
 Further, “such 
extension of the concept of theft to include trick, particular types of fraud, and 
the like is for the purpose of helping conviction of the offender,” which “has no 
proper application to the long-standing policy of civil protection of buyers from 
persons guilty of such trick or fraud” that lies at the root of good faith 
purchaser protection.
70
 
When the good faith purchaser doctrine was codified in the U.C.C., the 
codifiers seem to have been motivated by these basic considerations, but they 
nonetheless chose not to define the concept of voidable title beyond specifying 
a few situations where conflicting opinions had emerged in prior case law. The 
comments accompanying section 2-403 therefore describe these situations as 
“troublesome under prior law,” and the section itself identifies four scenarios 
that appear to be exemplars of such voidable title.
71
 
The first involves cases of impersonation—situations where the original 
owner “was deceived as to the identity of the purchaser.”
72
 The identity here 
relates to the factual dimension of the person and not their legal status. The 
second involves the common situation of bad checks that bounce owing to 
insufficient funds.
73
 Here, even though as a technical matter the original sale 
(from the owner to the fraudulent buyer) now lacks good consideration, the title 
is treated as voidable until actually avoided. The third situation involves “cash 
sales” where goods are delivered upon an agreement that no title is to transfer 
until actual payment is received.
74
 Despite such an agreement, the buyer (who 
 
 67. The original formulation of malum in se traces back to Blackstone, who identified theft as 
belonging to that category. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 28, at *54. 
 68. See U.C.C. § 2-403 cmt. 2 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1962). 
69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. § 2-403(1)(b). 
 74. Id. § 2-403(1)(c); see also WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 47, at 202. 
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doesn’t pay) obtains voidable rather than void title in the same way as she 
would in situations involving bad checks. The fourth situation covers instances 
where delivery of the goods is obtained through fraudulent behavior that would 
be punishable under criminal law as larcenous.
75
 Here, despite the possibility of 
criminal punishment, the law treats the purchaser’s title as merely voidable, 
allowing the good faith purchaser to obtain good title. 
The concept of voidable title thus emerged as a means by which to 
balance the true owner’s and the innocent purchaser’s interests, rather than as a 
mechanism for penalizing criminal conduct. Today, the concept covers title that 
is tainted by a wide variety of actions, with the sole exception of theft (which 
produces void title). 
C. Justifications for the Common Law Doctrine 
As it works today, the good faith purchaser doctrine—with its reliance on 
the idea of voidable title—splits the risk between the innocent purchaser and 
the original owner. The purchaser with no knowledge of the taint merely needs 
to ensure that the seller’s title has not been legally avoided prior to the sale, and 
that the transaction is otherwise at arm’s length and in good faith. The original 
owner, on the other hand, is thereby incentivized to (1) actively monitor all 
dealings with the goods and (2) expeditiously commence an action to invalidate 
the seller’s voidable title once a taint is detected so as to prevent the seller from 
passing on good title to a good faith purchaser. Two related, but nonetheless 
distinct, concerns therefore motivated the development and expansion of the 
doctrine. 
The first concern originates in the idea of consumer protection and its 
recognition that in a market economy, buyers—unlike sellers—have little 
specialized knowledge about the goods being purchased.
76
 This asymmetry in 
bargaining power and access to information necessitates shifting the risk of 
cloudy or ambiguous title away from an innocent, good faith buyer and onto 
the seller, who presumptively has the resources and expertise needed to 
eliminate such ambiguity in one way or another. Requiring a consumer to 
research a vendor’s title to the chattel in question, especially in the absence of a 
formal registration system for such ownership (for example, as there is for 
motor vehicles), would be both unfair and inefficient. With the expansion of 
the doctrine to new domains, the consumer protection rationale has begun to 
develop obvious fault lines, especially in situations where the buyer is not an 
individual consumer, but is instead a repeat participant such as a reseller or 
vendor.
77
 Grant Gilmore best described this rationale in the context of good 
faith purchasers when he observed that “[t]he policy of consumer protection 
 
 75. U.C.C. § 2-403(1)(d). 
 76. See Gilmore, supra note 1, at 1100–01; Fred H. Miller, Consumer Issues and the Revision 
of U.C.C. Article 2, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1565, 1579 (1994). 
 77. Gilmore, supra note 1, at 1100–01 
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defines or ought to define its own limits,”
78
 thus suggesting that the consumer 
protection rationale is of limited applicability. 
A second and more frequently advanced rationale lies in the idea of 
marketability.
79
 Here, the concern is less with the protection of the individual 
consumer (or with consumer welfare) and more with the systemic effects of 
uncertain title on the functioning of the market and sales of the object therein. 
In the absence of good faith purchaser protection, the pervasive uncertainty that 
would necessarily follow is likely to deter potential buyers from entering into 
market transactions out of fear that they would be saddled with the immediate 
consequences of the seller’s tainted title.
80
 Even if market transactions were to 
occur, it would likely have the effect of lowering the market’s valuation of the 
goods, since the price would now reflect this pervasive risk. Rooted in the idea 
of market efficiency, under this rationale the good faith purchaser doctrine is 
directed at generating and safeguarding a buyer’s marketable title.
81
 What 
matters in protecting a good faith purchaser’s ownership interest is the 
purchaser’s ability to further transfer or alienate that interest to others in the 
marketplace. The value of ownership, in other words, is presumed to reside 
primarily in its ability to generate value for the purchaser. 
It is important to appreciate that the concern with marketable title and 
valuation is altogether independent of any enforcement action on the part of the 
true owner. Regardless of whether the true owner finds it worthwhile to bring 
an action (for conversion or replevin) to recover the chattel, the uncertainty 
surrounding the good faith purchaser’s ability to pass on good title to others is 
itself seen as an impediment to the efficient functioning of the market. This 
point becomes critical as we move to the copyright context, since it reveals that 
one of the concerns motivating the doctrine is agnostic to the enforcement 
equilibrium, since that equilibrium is always influenced by a variety of external 
variables such as the availability of insurance, transaction costs, etc. The ideal 
of marketable title in the chattel is therefore analytically and functionally 
unconnected to the good faith purchaser’s (or indeed the true owner’s) 
behavior. The mere existence of the pervasive uncertainty relating to a 
purchaser’s ability to pass on good title to others imposes an externality on 
other market participants, which is likely to deter market behavior and render 
the overall functioning of the market less efficient.
82
 
 
 78. Id. at 1101. 
 79. See JONES, supra note 3, at 3 (“The policy of the Courts has been, so far as accords with 
justice, to promote the commerce of the nation, by making the circulation and negotiation of property 
‘as quick, as easy, and as certain as possible.’” (citations omitted)). 
 80. See id. at 3–4; Schwartz & Scott, supra note 3, at 1358 n.81. 
 81. See generally William D. Hawkland, Curing an Improper Tender of Title to Chattels: 
Past, Present and Commercial Code, 46 MINN. L. REV. 697 (1962). 
 82. Cf. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of 
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 24–41 (2000) (defending the numerus 
clausus principle as similarly seeking to protect information cost externalities). 
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II. 
COPYRIGHT LAW’S PUZZLING OMISSION 
Simply put, modern copyright law offers no substantive protection to 
good faith purchasers of objects embodying infringing expression. While the 
law doesn’t hold good faith purchasers liable for their purchase, it subjects their 
subsequent resale or alienation of the object (carrying infringing expression) to 
liability for infringement. Indeed, it does so despite being fully cognizant of the 
need to differentiate between ownership of expression and ownership of the 
chattel in which the expression is embodied.
83
 Copyright law thereby effects 
what has been described as a “forcing,” an involuntary imposition of ownership 
on someone.
84
 This Part attempts to unpack this anomaly. 
A. The Current Position 
Among the several rights that the 1976 Copyright Act grants copyright 
owners is the exclusive right “to distribute copies . . . of the copyrighted work 
to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or 
lending.”
85
 In effect, the exclusive right to alienate copies of the protected work 
thus resides with the copyright owner. The distribution right, as it is called, has 
long been seen as an essential part of the copyright owner’s bundle of rights 
and can be traced back to the earliest copyright statutes. 
On its face, the distribution right appears to extend only to a “public” 
distribution. However, the term “public” finds no definition in the statute, and 
presumably derives from the Act’s merger of vending and publication into an 
altogether new term.
86
 In the nearly four decades since the passage of the Act, 
no court has fully considered the meaning of “public” and whether it might 
limit the scope of the right. Nonetheless, the leading copyright treatise suggests 
that it does have some significance and notes that “private sales . . . fall outside 
the scope of infringement liability.”
87
 Since all sales are by definition private or 
bilateral in nature, determining when a sale is private (as opposed to public) is 
fraught with problems. The distinction seems to hinge on whether the 
acquisition of the object was open to any member of the public—such as when 
it is advertised, or listed for sale on a publicly accessible website or service—or 
whether it was limited to an identifiable individual.
88
 If this is indeed the only 
 
 83. 17 U.S.C. § 202 (2012) (“Ownership of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights under 
a copyright, is distinct from ownership of any material object in which the work is embodied.”). 
 84. See Lee Anne Fennell, Forcings, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1297 (2014). 
 85. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3). 
 86. 2 NIMMER, supra note 14, § 8.11[B][1]; see also 4 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON 
COPYRIGHT § 13.10 (2014) (adopting a similar position). But see John M. Kernochan, The 
Distribution Right in the United States of America: Review and Reflections, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1407, 
1410 (1989) (arguing that the term does not limit the distribution right). 
 87. 2 NIMMER, supra note 14, § 8.11[C][1][b] n.139. 
 88. See id. (suggesting the existence of a “designated recipient” to operationalize the 
distinction); 4 PATRY, supra note 86, § 13.10 (suggesting that the distinction is whether the 
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distinction, it hinges entirely on to whom the defendant might have been 
willing to sell the product, which is impossible to effectively ascertain ex post. 
This likely explains why courts routinely assume that nearly any distribution 
about which the plaintiff has actual proof is sufficiently public to qualify as an 
actionable distribution.
89
 
A far more important limitation on the distribution right—and one that is 
today codified in the 1976 Act—is the first sale doctrine.
90
 Early in the 
development of the distribution right under prior statutes, the question emerged 
whether the exclusive right to distribute copies amounted to a restraint on the 
ability of a chattel owner to freely transfer or use the physical object (i.e., 
chattel) in which the copy was embedded. If the two were coterminus, 
copyright’s distribution right would operate as an equitable servitude on the 
chattel, restricting its owner’s ability to alienate it.
91
 The issue reached the 
Supreme Court in the 1908 case of Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus.
92
 There, the 
plaintiff owned the copyright in a book, imposed a minimum resale price on 
dealers, and purported to treat violations of the price condition as an act of 
copyright infringement through notice on the first page of every book.
93
 The 
statute in question granted copyright owners the “sole right to vend” protected 
copies,
94
 largely analogous to today’s “exclusive right to distribute.” 
Interpreting the true scope of the right, the Court refused to construe it as 
allowing the copyright owner “to restrict future sales.”
95
 As the Court put it: 
What the complainant contends for embraces not only the right to sell 
the copies, but to qualify the title of a future purchaser by the 
reservation of the right to have the remedies of the statute against an 
infringer because of the printed notice of its purpose so to do unless 
the purchaser sells at a price fixed in the notice. To add to the right of 
exclusive sale the authority to control all future retail sales, by a notice 
that such sales must be made at a fixed sum, would give a right not 
included in the terms of the statute, and, in our view, extend its 
operation, by construction, beyond its meaning, when interpreted with 
a view to ascertaining the legislative intent in its enactment.
96
 
 
distribution was to someone as a member of the “general public” or as an identifiable person such as a 
“family member, friend, colleague, or the like”). 
 89. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Prods., Inc., 930 F.2d 277, 300 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(“[A] violation of section 106(3) can also occur when illicit copies of a copyrighted work are only 
distributed to one person.”); Luar Music Corp. v. Universal Music Grp., 861 F. Supp. 2d 30, 40 
(D.P.R. 2012); Jalbert v. Grautski, 554 F. Supp. 2d 57, 68 (D. Mass. 2008); Psihoyos v. Liberation, 
Inc., No. 96 CIV. 3609, 1997 WL 218468, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 1997). 
 90. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2012). 
 91. See generally Chafee, supra note 12; Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, The New Servitudes, 
96 GEO. L.J. 885, 910–14 (2008). 
 92. 210 U.S. 339 (1908). 
 93. Id. at 341–42. 
 94. Copyright Act of 1860, § 4952, 3 Stat. 3380, 3406 (1901). 
 95. Bobbs-Merrill Co., 210 U.S. at 350. 
 96. Id. at 351. 
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Thus emerged what has since come to be known as the “first sale” doctrine. 
The Copyright Act of 1909 codified the first sale doctrine, and made clear that 
“the copyright is distinct from the property in the material object copyrighted” 
and that the Act did not “forbid, prevent, or restrict the transfer of any copy of a 
copyrighted work the possession of which has been lawfully obtained.”
97
 
The current statute maintains this position but qualifies it in several 
important respects. Section 109(a) contains the first sale doctrine and allows an 
“owner” to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of a copy “lawfully 
made” under the terms of the statute.
98
 In other words, the availability of the 
first sale doctrine is contingent on the transferred copy being noninfringing. If, 
or when, that copy is itself unlawfully made, that is, infringing, the defense 
simply does not apply. Indeed, recent decisions of the Court affirm without 
doubt this basic proposition.
99
 
To the extent that the first sale doctrine was meant to be copyright law’s 
primary mechanism of ensuring that it does not “qualify the title” of the chattel 
owner by “restrict[ing] future sales,” it is limited exclusively to owners of 
lawfully made copies.
100
 The Copyright Office put it best when it noted that 
“[t]he distribution right . . . enables the copyright owner to prevent alienation of 
the copy—up to a point . . . when ownership of a lawfully made copy is 
transferred to another person.”
101
 A good faith purchaser of an object 
embodying an infringing copy is therefore altogether outside any protection 
offered by the first sale doctrine. 
Additionally, copyright infringement today is conceived of as a strict 
liability tort, meaning that the infringer’s precise state of mind is irrelevant to 
the question of wrongdoing.
102
 The Copyright Act treats the question of the 
infringer’s knowledge, intent, or negligence as irrelevant to the imposition of 
liability, though the infringer’s innocence is a factor that courts are allowed to 
consider in determining the appropriate remedy or the quantum of damages.
103
 
Consequently, the good faith purchaser obtains no protection under the scienter 
requirements of copyright infringement. 
 
 97. Copyright Act of 1909, § 41, 320 Stat. 1075, 1084 (1909). 
 98. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2012). 
 99. See, e.g., Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013); Quality King 
Distribs., Inc. v. L’Anza Research Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135 (1998). 
 100. Bobbs-Merrill Co., 210 U.S. at 35–51. 
 101. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, DMCA SECTION 104 REPORT 86–87 (2001). 
 102. See, e.g., United States v. Liu, 731 F.3d 982, 988 (9th Cir. 2013) (“In a civil suit, liability 
for copyright infringement is strict.”); Monge v. Maya Magazines, Inc., 688 F.3d 1164, 1170 (9th Cir. 
2012) (observing that the “innocent intent” of the defendant was no defense to infringement); Faulkner 
v. Nat’l Geographic Soc’y, 576 F. Supp. 2d 609, 613 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“Copyright infringement is a 
strict liability wrong in the sense that a plaintiff need not prove wrongful intent or culpability.”); Educ. 
Testing Serv. v. Simon, 95 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1087 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (“There is no need to prove 
anything about a defendant’s mental state to establish copyright infringement; it is a strict liability 
tort.”); 4 NIMMER, supra note 14, § 13.08[B][1]. 
 103. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 405(b), 406(a), 504(c)(2). 
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Owing to these limitations, the good faith purchaser of an object 
embodying infringing expression must hold on to the object for the duration of 
the copyright term, or risk being treated as an infringer subjected to some level 
of liability in transferring it in any way to members of the public. The statute’s 
expansive definition of distribution in effect renders the purchaser’s title 
altogether inalienable. 
B. A Misplaced Rationale for the Omission 
While Bobbs-Merrill did not expressly mention the “lawfully made” 
limitation on the first sale doctrine, it is crucial to appreciate that the lack of 
protection for good faith purchasers emerged independently and in a manner 
that is analytically distinct from the narrowing of the first sale doctrine.
104
 The 
first sale doctrine merely failed to remedy a preexisting and independent 
problem created by copyright law’s gradual erosion and eventual elimination of 
the “innocent infringer” defense to copyright infringement.
105
 
Copyright infringement is a strict liability tort in the sense that the 
defendant’s state of mind—intent, negligence, or knowledge—is altogether 
irrelevant to the determination of liability. This remains copyright’s position 
regardless of the precise right involved or the nature of the defendant’s 
infringing activity.
106
 In other words, liability is strict regardless of whether the 
infringement is of the exclusive right to reproduce, perform, distribute, or any 
other enumerated right relating to the protected work. 
As a historical matter, however, this was not the case under earlier 
copyright statutes. The Copyright Act of 1790 (much like the Statute of 
Anne)
107
 drew a distinction in its treatment of infringement between liability 
for reproducing or publishing the work, and liability for selling or vending an 
infringing work.
108
 As to the latter, which corresponds to the modern 
distribution right, the statute provided that liability would attach: 
[I]f any other person or persons . . . shall print, reprint, publish, or 
import . . . any copy or copies of such map, chart, book or books, 
without the consent of the author or proprietor thereof . . . ; or knowing 
the same to be so printed, reprinted, or imported, shall publish, sell, or 
expose to sale, or cause to be published, sold or exposed to sale, any 
copy of such map, chart, book or books, without such consent first had 
and obtained in writing.
109
 
 
 104. Indeed, it seems to have flowed from U.S. copyright law’s gradual elimination of the 
innocent infringer defense. For an excellent overview of this occurrence, see Reese, supra note 16, at 
133. 
 105. Id. 
 106. See 4 NIMMER, supra note 14, § 13.08[B][1] (“In actions for statutory copyright 
infringement, the innocent intent of the defendant constitutes no defense to liability.”). 
 107. See Act for the Encouragement of Learning, 8 Ann., c. 19, § II (1710) (Gr. Brit.). 
 108. See Copyright Act of 1790, § 2, 1 Stat. 124, 124 (1790). 
 109. Id. (emphasis added). 
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For liability to attach for selling or vending an article containing infringing 
expression, the seller therefore had to know of the infringing nature of the 
product in question.
110
 The provision succeeded in creating a bifurcated system 
of liability, which remained in all copyright legislation until the enactment of 
the 1909 Act—in effect establishing an “innocent seller” exception to copyright 
infringement. 
The innocent seller exception offered significantly wider protection than 
the common law’s good faith purchaser doctrine. First, it treated the 
requirement of knowledge as an element of the plaintiff’s prima facie case. 
Although analytically it remained an exception to infringement, as a structural 
matter it was not a defense but rather an affirmative requirement of the 
plaintiff’s case to establish infringement. Perhaps for this reason, courts seem 
to have adhered to the requirement in varying degrees, depending on context.
111
 
Second, the primary impetus for the exception was to free large sellers from 
having to bear the prohibitive costs of determining the infringing nature of 
expression embodied in their products (primarily books).
112
 The rationale for 
the exception was thus the protection of sellers—and their overall enterprise—
rather than the marketability of the individual goods themselves. Consumer 
protection, so to speak, had very little to do with the innocent seller exception, 
reflected in the emphasis on the seller rather than the purchaser. Third, by 
conditioning liability on the seller’s knowledge of the underlying infringement, 
the seller was able to avoid liability in a variety of different situations, 
especially where the copying wasn’t a direct reproduction of the protected 
work. In such situations, establishing that the seller had knowledge of the 
infringing nature of the underlying content remained fraught with difficulty, 
and often impossible to prove in individual cases.
113
 It is perhaps owing to a 
mix of these reasons that courts came to apply the exception somewhat 
erratically, on occasion completely ignoring the mandate of the statute.
114
 
The Copyright Act of 1909 altogether eliminated the exception for 
innocent infringers, rejecting any consideration of the defendant’s state of mind 
 
 110. See EATON S. DRONE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL 
PRODUCTIONS 487 (1879) (observing that for a seller to be liable for copyright infringement, “it must 
be shown” that the seller “was aware of th[e] fact” of the underlying infringement). 
 111. For an overview, see Reese, supra note 16, at 156–60. 
 112. See id. at 160 (noting how a “seller of copyrighted works would generally be poorly 
positioned to determine whether the copies she sold were infringing”). 
 113. See ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988, 999 (2d Cir. 1983) 
(“[T]he problems of proof inherent in a rule that would permit innocent intent as a defense to copyright 
infringement could substantially undermine the protections Congress intended to afford to copyright 
holders.”); 4 NIMMER, supra note 14, § 13.08[B][1] (noting how an additional problem with the 
exception is that “a defendant may easily plead innocence, and the plaintiff [may] be left without any 
practical ability to disprove it”). 
 114. See Reese, supra note 16, at 156–60. 
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in determining copyright infringement.
115
 This change in position was 
conscious, since the “innocent infringer” was discussed during hearings leading 
up to the passage of the Act.
116
 The sole form of protection for innocent 
infringers was in the limitation of remedies.
117
 
The Act of 1976 preserved this structure. Legislative history 
accompanying the Act reveals that Congress closely considered—but 
ultimately rejected—the possibility of reintroducing protection for innocent 
infringers.
118
 Indeed, the history suggests that in the intervening period the 
Supreme Court had come to accept the reality that “good faith of the 
defendants” was altogether irrelevant to the question of infringement.
119
 
Responding to a study by the Copyright Office on the question of reintroducing 
innocent infringer protection, noted copyright scholar Melville Nimmer offered 
the following reasons for why the law should avoid such protection: 
It is my view that basic to the problem of innocent infringement must 
be the underlying premise that as between two innocent parties (i.e., 
the copyright owner and the infringer), it is the infringer who must 
suffer, since he, unlike the copyright owner, either has an opportunity 
to guard against the infringement (by diligent inquiry), or at least the 
ability to guard against the infringement [contractually or through 
insurance]. . . . Moreover, it is generally true that the volume 
purveyors of copyrighted materials . . . are, in fact, innocent of any 
knowledge of infringement. Even where there is an absence of such 
innocence, it is usually on the basis of negligence (of a type difficult to 
establish), rather than knowledge. Therefore, to render a complete or 
partial exemption for the innocent infringer would seriously impair the 
protection afforded to a copyright owner.
120
 
Nimmer’s observations highlight the prevailing understanding at the time, 
which Congress came to endorse as part of the 1976 Act. Exempting innocent 
sellers from liability for infringement was, as noted previously, premised on the 
idea that they bear an undue burden as part of their product sales. This concern 
alone, as Nimmer suggests, was hardly worthy of protection—especially at the 
expense of the copyright owner’s interests. To the extent that sellers were 
taking a risk when purveying potentially infringing goods, they could obtain an 
 
 115. Alan Latman & William S. Tager, Study No. 25: Liability of Innocent Infringers of 
Copyrights, in COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION: STUDIES PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON 
PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS 139, 141 (1958) (“[T]he 1909 statute contained no broad 
provisions excusing innocent infringers.”); Reese, supra note 14, at 175. 
 116. Latman & Tager, supra note 115, at 141. 
 117. Id. 
 118. As an example, see id. at 135–69. 
 119. See id. at 145. 
 120. Melville B. Nimmer et al., Comments and Views Submitted to the Copyright Office on 
Liability of Innocent Infringers of Copyright, in COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, supra note 115, at 159, 
169. These concerns find discussion in the Nimmer treatise as well. See 4 NIMMER, supra note 14,  
§ 13.08[B][1]. 
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indemnity agreement from the manufacturer, protect their interests through 
insurance, or both.
121
 As Nimmer points out, volume sellers are usually 
blissfully (or willfully) ignorant of the infringement in question, even when not 
altogether innocent or in full knowledge of the same. Calibrating when and 
how liability might be imposed on such intermediate situations thus posed a 
host of additional concerns, all of which could be at the expense of the 
copyright owner’s rights. Not surprisingly, in 1976 Congress avoided 
extending any protection to the innocent infringer or seller as a matter of 
substantive liability and retained a series of minor protections at the remedial 
stage, just as it had in 1909. This remains the law today. 
With the elimination of the innocent seller exception and the curtailment 
of the first sale doctrine, good faith purchasers were left with no substantive 
protection under copyright law. It is important to appreciate that when 
discussing innocent infringer protection under copyright law, the legislative 
history focused on broad-based protection (i.e., relating to liability in general) 
and not narrower protection relating to good faith purchasers as a separate 
class of market participants. Indeed, this point is borne out in Nimmer’s 
comments about the seller being able to obtain a contractual indemnity or 
insurance protection against infringement—both of which assume a 
commercial vendor rather than an individual attempting to sell their used 
product, such as Joe in our earlier hypothetical. Consequently, the legislative 
history contains no direct discussion of copyright law’s deviation from the 
common law in relation to good faith purchasers. 
All the same, courts have interpreted modern copyright law as 
consciously choosing against good faith purchaser protection. The Second 
Circuit considered this question in Platt & Munk Co. v. Republic Graphics, 
Inc.
122
 There, the defendant argued that it was in lawful possession of goods 
embodying the plaintiff copyright holder’s protected works, by virtue of a 
contractual delivery, which the defendant was allowed to resell without 
permission under the first sale doctrine.
123
 In rejecting the idea that “lawful 
possession” might be sufficient to transfer title, the court noted that such an 
interpretation would allow “any bailee of such objects [to] sell them without 
infringing the copyright, whatever his liability for conversion might be.”
124
 The 
court found this to be problematic because it would mean that “an innocent 
purchaser of a copy from a conceded pirate would be free to resell it without 
liability for infringement” and “cases to the contrary are legion.”
125
 This last 
 
 121. Nimmer et al., supra note 120, at 164, 169. This argument and its solution are discussed in 
some detail later on, in the context of the need for good faith purchaser protection in copyright law. 
Ralph Brown, another copyright scholar, has also echoed and emphasized the point. Id. at 164 
(commentary by Ralph S. Brown). 
 122. 315 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1963). 
 123. Id. at 849–50. 
 124. Id. at 851. 
 125. Id. (citations omitted). 
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observation is without doubt a direct rejection of good faith purchaser 
protection. 
Later cases shed more light on the analytical basis for this rejection. In 
American International Pictures, Inc. v. Foreman,
126
 the Fifth Circuit dealt 
with a case of copyright infringement that the owners of copyrights in multiple 
motion pictures brought against a film distributor. The defendants contended 
that since they were in lawful possession of copies of the films—from the 
copyright owner—they were exempt from liability for further distributing those 
copies.
127
 Again, the court rejected this argument, observing that “an unwitting 
purchaser who buys a copy in the secondary market can be held liable for 
infringement if the copy was not the subject of a first sale by the copyright 
holder.”
128
 To support its logic the court further treated as uncontested the 
principle that “unless title to the copy passes through a first sale by the 
copyright holder, subsequent sales do not confer good title.”
129
 The court was 
thereby implying that in the absence of a first sale the purchaser’s legal title is 
tainted and copyright law offers no immunity from infringement. More recent 
cases have put the point even more starkly, observing in no uncertain terms that 
“there is no such thing as a bona fide purchase for value in copyright law”
130
 
and that copyright contains “[n]o good faith purchaser exception to the first 
sale doctrine.”
131
 
Yet, when one probes courts’ reasons for rejecting good faith purchaser 
protection, things become somewhat murky. Their reasoning can be traced 
back to a crucial non sequitur in understanding the relationship between 
ownership of an object and the copyright in content embedded into the object. 
After 1909, copyright law clearly abandoned the need to establish knowledge 
or intent as an element of copyright infringement. In this sense, the seller’s 
innocence was therefore no defense to infringement. The Second Circuit in 
Platt & Munk, discussed above, was therefore correct in noting that an innocent 
purchaser who resells the infringing copy would face liability for copyright 
infringement, even when they would be immune from tort liability for 
conversion.
132
 Implicit in this analysis is the idea that since the common law 
recognized a valid title in the purchaser (under the good faith purchaser 
doctrine), liability for conversion would never attach. Copyright law certainly 
does not recognize such immunity from liability since it contains no protection 
for innocent purchasers. 
 
 126. 576 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1978). 
 127. Id. at 663–64. 
 128. Id. at 664. 
 129. Id. 
 130. ISC-Bunker Ramo Corp. v. Altech, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 1310, 1331 (N.D. Ill. 1990). 
 131. Novell, Inc. v. Unicom Sales, Inc., No. C–03–2785, 2004 WL 1839117, at *12 (C.D. Cal. 
Aug. 17, 2004). 
 132. Platt & Munk Co. v. Republic Graphics, Inc., 315 F.2d 847, 851 (2d Cir. 1963). 
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All the same, the absence of such immunity from liability does not arise 
because of any infirmity in the purchaser’s underlying legal title (owing to the 
absence of a first sale) as the Fifth Circuit implies. Indeed it is the absence of 
such immunity—and the resultant inability to alienate the object further 
without risk—that produces the practical imperfection in the purchaser’s title, 
and not the other way around. The Fifth Circuit’s reasoning inverts this logic 
by mistakenly treating the consequence involved (i.e., functionally imperfect 
title) as its very cause (i.e., legally imperfect title). The mere possibility of 
liability for copyright infringement says nothing about the purchaser’s title to 
the chattel itself. A transferor might become subject to liability to one party 
while simultaneously transferring title to another. The mere possibility of such 
liability does not legally affect the transferor’s ability to transfer good title, 
even though we might note that as a practical matter the persistence of potential 
liability impairs the transferor’s title. Thus, when the Fifth Circuit 
unequivocally noted that it was only when there was a legal first sale that there 
could be a transfer of good title, and that infringing sales were incapable of 
transferring good title to the object, that proposition had no independent 
basis.
133
 Neither copyright law nor the common law require or suggest such a 
conclusion. 
The risk of liability for copyright infringement may well exist at the time 
that a chattel containing protected expression is transferred from one person to 
another. Notwithstanding the existence of such risk, title nevertheless certainly 
passes from transferor to transferee. Especially given the well-known reality 
that title is a “relative” concept,
134
 in that it operates between two individuals, 
the mere existence of good title in the transferee need not immunize the 
transferor from liability for copyright infringement. The importance of this 
logic, which originates in copyright law’s structure as a private law mechanism 
rather than as a system of public regulation, cannot be overstated. 
Although copyright law grants copyright owners a cause of action for 
interference with their exclusive right to distribute, it does not seek to enforce 
that right independent of the copyright owners’ own actions. In other words, it 
actively delegates the decision of whether and when to pursue an action to the 
private party involved, resulting in horizontal actions between two private 
parties.
135
 This is materially different from situations where the law actively 
penalizes or criminalizes certain market transfers and subjects transferors to 
 
 133. Am. Int’l Pictures, Inc., 576 F.2d at 664. 
 134. For a recent account of this idea, see David Fox, Relativity of Title at Law and in Equity, 
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 135. For a general discussion of how copyright law delegates enforcement to private actors, i.e., 
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punishment for attempting such transfers.
136
 Certain kinds of cultural artifacts, 
animal products, hazardous materials, weapons, and the like fall into these 
categories. When the law forbids transfers of such objects, it would be 
appropriate to suggest that the very transfer being opposed to the law becomes 
void, in effect tainting it altogether, resulting in there being no lawful transfer 
of title.
137
 However, when the law doesn’t forbid the transfer but instead merely 
subjects it to potential private law liability, it makes little sense to suggest that 
the transfer itself doesn’t produce good title in the transferee.
138
 
Treating an infringing, nonfirst sale as incapable of transferring title rests 
on a belief that it is the copyright owner who has good title to such infringing 
articles, since the only way to legalize them is through the copyright owner’s 
authorization. Yet this conflates ownership of the infringing article with 
ownership of the copyright, a proposition that copyright law vehemently tries 
to distance itself from.
139
 Indeed even early common law came to reject this 
conflation when copyright owners attempted to rely on the ownership-based 
doctrine of chattel replevin to demand that infringing copies be delivered to 
them upon a finding of infringement.
140
 Treating title to the chattel, even when 
it incorporates infringing content, as independent from ownership of copyright 
is thus a well-enshrined ideal—one that the Fifth Circuit’s logic turns on its 
very head. 
The Fifth Circuit’s observation could be read to suggest that the purchaser 
did not obtain good title in the narrow sense of being able to further transfer the 
work onto others without potential liability. However, this would make sense 
only if the court was using the idea of “good title” entirely in explanatory 
terms, as denoting the consequence of no immunity. As noted previously, 
however, the court appears to use the phrase as a justification for the lack of 
immunity; in other words, as a reason rather than as a consequence. This 
 
 136. See generally Robert Iraola, A Primer on the Criminal Penalty Provisions of the Native 
American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 28 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 431 (2003); Susan Rose-
Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 931 (1985). 
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courts as void. See Trotter v. Nelson, 684 N.E.2d 1150, 1153 (Ind. 1997), abrogated on other grounds 
by Liggett v. Young, 877 N.E.2d 178 (Ind. 2007); 15 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS  
§ 79.2 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., 2014). 
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 139. 17 U.S.C. § 202 (2012); see also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 124 (1976), reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5739 (describing the principle as “a fundamental and important one”). 
 140. See Colburn v. Simms (1843) 67 Eng. Rep. 224 (Ch.) 229; 2 Hare 543, 554–55 (refusing 
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renders such a reading suspect and confirms the court’s circular logic. Further, 
to suggest that good title in the object is somehow related to potential copyright 
liability produces the anomaly that a person with bad title at the time of the 
transfer somehow obtains good title the moment the copyright term in the 
underlying content expires. A third and equally troublesome reading of the 
court’s observation is that its use of the term “title” was in relation to the 
underlying copyright, not the physical object. Again, this seems improbable 
since the court’s entire discussion was in relation to the first sale doctrine, 
which relates only to the physical object and not the sale of the copyright.
141
 In 
addition, the statute defines “copies” in terms of the “material object . . . in 
which a work is fixed,” making this distinction clear.
142
 
Consequently, a copyright law-compliant first sale is hardly a prerequisite 
for good title in the copy. The problem with the Fifth Circuit’s logic in 
American International Pictures is that it suggests, especially to other courts, 
that copyright law’s omission of good faith purchaser protection relates 
somehow to the intrinsically tainted nature of that purchaser’s title. Copyright 
law, however, says nothing about that. Yet, almost every court in the country 
that has since considered the question makes reference to the title-based logic 
of the Fifth Circuit, giving it an aura of credibility that it simply does not seem 
to deserve.
143
 
Caught between the elimination of the innocent seller exception, the 
narrowing of the first sale defense, and the faulty logic connecting title to 
potential liability for copyright infringement, copyright law today contains no 
version of protection for good faith purchasers of value. Substantively much of 
the fear with such protection is its negative impact on copyright owners and 
their market. Allowing purchasers to further alienate infringing copies of a 
work without liability can crowd out the market for original, noninfringing 
versions, which is in turn likely to interfere with copyright’s incentive to create. 
What this concern ignores is the possibility of an intermediate position that 
remains sensitive to the concerns of both purchasers and copyright owners. 
C. Justifying Good Faith Purchaser Protection in Copyright Law 
As noted previously, the two principal reasons for the development of the 
good faith purchaser doctrine at common law were consumer protection and 
marketability.
144
 Consumers were seen to be at a serious informational 
disadvantage vis-à-vis nefarious vendors whose title was tainted in some way. 
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In recognition of this, the law chose to split the risk of such nefarious behavior 
equally between the true owner and the good faith purchaser.
145
 Similarly, the 
common law was concerned that saddling consumers with the consequences of 
nefarious intermediaries would impede consumers’ willingness to purchase 
goods. Without protection, purchasers would run the risk of losing their 
acquisitions if the chain of title was tainted in some way despite best efforts to 
ensure good title.
146
 Not surprisingly, both reasons carry over to the modern 
copyright context, albeit with some modification. 
Copyright law has undoubtedly expanded over the last few decades. This 
expansion has been in terms of altogether new subject matter as well as 
expanded coverage for existing subject matter.
147
 Taken together with 
copyright’s elimination of formalities as a prerequisite for protection,
148
 this 
reality has unquestionably had the effect of dramatically increasing the 
likelihood of protected expression being copied, often times without the 
infringer’s knowledge of such copying or its unlawfulness.
149
 As the Supreme 
Court recently confirmed, an overwhelming majority of consumer products 
today contain copyrighted expression in some form or another; either in the 
form of software code, or literary and artistic content contained in the product’s 
packaging, design, or instructions.
150
 While this in itself poses a challenge for 
consumers to determine the legality of a manufacturer’s use of such content, 
the problem is compounded to a large degree by the nonmodular nature of such 
content within consumer products. 
In a vast majority of consumer products where copyrighted content is 
used, even if a consumer is able to discern and identify the existence of 
copyrighted content, such content ordinarily remains inseparable—to the 
consumer—from the rest of the product involved.
151
 Returning to our example 
involving Joe and Honda’s use of infringing software code: even if Joe were 
informed that his car contained such infringing code, he is very likely (unless 
he is a Honda engineer!) in no position to disaggregate the infringing software 
from the car to convert the car into a noninfringing article when he decides to 
sell it a few years later to someone else. To him, the fundamentally nonmodular 
 
 145. See id. 
 146. See id. 
 147. See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY 
AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY (2004); WILLIAM PATRY, 
MORAL PANICS AND THE COPYRIGHT WARS (2009); Neil Netanel, Why Has Copyright Expanded? 
Analysis and Critique, in 6 NEW DIRECTIONS IN COPYRIGHT LAW 3 (Fiona Macmillan ed., 2007). 
 148. For an excellent overview of how U.S. copyright law came to eliminate copyright 
formalities, see Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 485, 487–88 
(2004). 
 149. See Reese, supra note 16, at 135–44. 
 150. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1365 (2013). 
 151. Property scholars have occasionally used the term “lumpy” to describe this attribute of 
resources and the entitlements in them. See Lee Anne Fennell, Lumpy Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 
1955, 1957–61 (2012). 
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nature of the product means that the existence of some infringing content in 
any small—and inseparable—part of the product could well have the effect of 
rendering all of it useless. Indeed, this is true in varying degrees for all products 
embodying expression, including literary works such as books.
152
 If a consumer 
purchases a novel at a bookstore and later learns that a tenth of the book is 
directly copied, the consumer has no way of ripping out only the infringing 
content (even assuming it were identifiable) without destroying the entirety of 
the book at the time that they seek to sell it used. Here again, the integrated 
nature of the physical embodiment compounds consumers’ fundamental 
inability to even know whether expressive content contained in their products 
is infringing. 
Added to this is of course, the well-recognized reality that determining 
whether content is infringing requires recourse to courts. In situations where 
the putatively infringing content isn’t identical to the copyrighted content, but 
is at best “substantially similar,”
153
 determining whether actionable 
infringement occurred is a highly complex question, even for lawyers well-
versed in copyright law. It is therefore unrealistic to expect this of lay 
consumers.
154
 In short, the belief that an innocent purchaser will be able to 
determine, through any amount of “diligence,” whether (1) there is copyrighted 
content in the product purchased; (2) such content is infringing in nature, as a 
matter of copyright law; and (3) the content, even if infringing, is capable of 
being excised from the rest of the product, is altogether unrealistic. 
Even if such diligence is conceded to be insufficient, one might still argue 
that purchasers who choose to eventually sell the product in question (without 
knowing whether the expressive content embedded within it is infringing) have 
the option of protecting their interests by seeking a contractual indemnity from 
the manufacturer (i.e., original seller) of the product. Indeed, as seen earlier, 
this argument was central to many commentators’ rejection of the innocent 
seller exception to infringement under the 1976 Act.
155
 An indemnity 
agreement as a mechanism of protection makes much sense when the seller is a 
commercial entity that is regularly involved in selling goods.
156
 In these 
 
 152. Especially in relation to what is described as fragmented literal similarity. See Twin Peaks 
Prods., Inc. v. Publ’ns. Int’l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1372 (2d Cir. 1993); TufAmerica, Inc. v. Diamond, 
968 F. Supp. 2d 588, 597 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). The original formulation comes from the Nimmer treatise. 
3 NIMMER, supra note 14, §§ 13–28.  
 153. See generally Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Irina D. Manta & Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Judging 
Similarity, 100 IOWA L. REV. 267, 272–78 (2014). 
 154. Id. 
 155. See Nimmer, supra note 120, at 169. 
 156. For a useful discussion of where this practice was ubiquitous at the time of the drafting of 
the 1976 Act, see Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Study No. 23: The Operation of the Damage Provisions of the 
Copyright Law: An Exploratory Study, in COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, supra note 115, at 59, 86 
(1958) (observing how indemnities are “elaborately developed” in relation to a set of actors, all of 
whom are commercial); see also Frank L. Fine, Record Piracy and Modern Problems of Innocent 
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situations, obtaining an indemnity from a “supplier”
157
 works as an efficient 
mechanism of mitigating the risk of liability from distributing a potentially 
infringing product. All the same, an indemnity (or indeed insurance) makes 
little sense for an individual, i.e., noncommercial, purchaser who might choose 
to purchase a product for personal use, and then sell it as a used good several 
years later. In these situations—ubiquitous in today’s marketplace—seeking an 
indemnity from a seller at each transition point in the chain of title adds a layer 
of transaction costs that could in the long run interfere with consumers’ very 
willingness to resell everyday objects. 
Indeed, the U.C.C. also recognizes this fundamental limitation. Section 2-
312(3) of the U.C.C. deals with the implied warranty against infringement, and 
provides that unless disclaimed, a seller “warrants that the goods shall be 
delivered free of the rightful claim of any third person by way of infringement 
or the like.”
158
 Importantly, however, this applies only to a seller “regularly 
dealing in goods of the kind” involved.
159
 In other words, the U.C.C. 
consciously excludes individual, noncommercial resellers from its ambit, an 
omission that is considered altogether unproblematic.
160
 
Going back to our hypothetical involving Joe and his Honda Civic: if Joe 
buys Frank’s Honda Civic and Cindy later seeks to buy it from Joe, the parties 
are all individual consumers engaged in one-off transactions. In each sale, 
neither party seeks to sell or buy used cars commercially. Consequently, it is 
unrealistic to presume that buyers will be in a position to require their 
individual seller to indemnify against all future copyright infringement arising 
from sales of the car. Frank may, unless expressly disclaimed, obtain an 
implied indemnity from the Honda dealer. However, this implied indemnity 
will not extend to Joe since Frank himself is not a commercial dealer. Frank is 
also unlikely to be willing to issue Joe such an indemnity, nor is Joe or any 
subsequent buyer likely to bargain for one. A single break in the chain of 
indemnities renders such protection meaningless. 
The indemnity argument therefore cannot apply to the situation of 
individual purchasers and sellers, and its application misapprehends altogether 
the way chattels regularly change hands in society. Individual purchasers are 
unlikely to see the need for an indemnity against liability for their resales, and 
lack the negotiating power to demand such an indemnity from an original 
seller, usually a commercial vendor. While the indemnity rationale may have 
 
Copyright Infringement, 8 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 69, 87 (1983) (noting that, even in relation to some 
commercial establishments such as record retailers, obtaining indemnities is problematic). 
 157. 4 NIMMER, supra note 14, § 13.08[B][1]. 
 158. U.C.C. § 2-312(3) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2014). 
 159. Id. In addition, the drafters seem to have contemplated only patent and trademark 
infringement, as evidenced in the official commentary, raising the question whether copyright 
infringement was consciously omitted from the coverage of the provision. Id. § 2-312 off. cmt. 2. 
 160. Id. § 2-312 off. cmt. 3 (“A sale by a person other than a dealer, however, raises no 
implication in its circumstances of such a warranty.”). 
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been forceful as an argument against the innocent seller defense, especially in 
relation to commercial vendors, its fundamental orientation is different from 
that of the good faith purchaser, which focuses instead on the individual qua 
purchaser rather than on the individual qua repeat seller. 
A second concern is the effect of such pervasive uncertainty on the overall 
marketability of objects. If consumers have no way of accurately determining 
whether a product embodies infringing expression—knowing of the possibility 
that if it does, their title becomes inalienable and the product could be seized or 
destroyed
161
—their very willingness to purchase such products downstream in 
the open marketplace could be impeded in the long run. To be sure, this has yet 
to occur despite copyright law’s lack of good faith purchaser protection; 
arguably, the theoretical possibility of such risk aversion remains hypothetical 
at best. 
However, there are at least two reasons to be less sanguine about this 
reality in today’s context. First, the size and coverage of the market for used 
goods has grown exponentially over the last several years.
162
 The advent of the 
Internet and ecommerce has spurred this growth, putting a wider range of 
individual sellers in contact with potential buyers (through services such as 
eBay, Craigslist, and the like.
163
 As the volume and context for these 
transactions grow, the pervasive uncertainty in their ownership and legality can 
have negative consequences for the marketplace and for copyright law 
generally. This is true even if these consequences are yet to be seen directly, 
since copyright owners are yet to begin suing good faith purchasers who 
attempt to transfer their infringing products on the used goods market. 
Interestingly, in its most recent decision on the first sale doctrine, the Supreme 
Court directly addressed the argument that the harm from such uncertainty was 
greatly “exaggerated”
164
 since uncertainty had not been empirically shown to 
have impacted consumer sales. Despite the questionable legality of the type of 
sales involved, consumers had not exhibited the risk aversion that one might 
legitimately worry about. The Court’s response was simple: copyright law, 
consumers, and commerce should not have to rely on copyright owners’ 
forbearance. As the Court put it: 
[T]he fact that harm has proved limited so far may simply reflect the 
reluctance of copyright holders so far to assert [their] resale rights. 
 
 161. 17 U.S.C. § 503(b) (2012) (authorizing the court to “order the destruction or other 
reasonable disposition of all copies . . . found to have been made or used in violation of the copyright 
owner’s exclusive rights”). 
 162. See generally Brief of eBay, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Kirtsaeng 
v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013) (No. 11-697), 
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 163. Id. 
 164. Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1390 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The absence of such suits 
indicates that the ‘practical problems’ hypothesized by the Court are greatly exaggerated.”). 
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They may decide differently if the law is clarified in their favor. 
Regardless, a copyright law that can work in practice only if 
unenforced is not a sound copyright law. It is a law that would create 
uncertainty, would bring about selective enforcement, and, if widely 
unenforced, would breed disrespect for copyright law itself. . . . [T]he 
practical problems . . . are too serious, too extensive, and too likely to 
come about for us to dismiss them as insignificant.
165
 
In short, uncertainty over the legality of a transfer risks limiting the 
pervasiveness and ubiquity of such transfers in the future, especially as the 
market for used goods continues to grow and expand. 
Additionally, there is good reason to believe that such collective 
forbearance
166
 may be a thing of the past. While copyright owners may choose 
not to sue individual resellers for violations of the distribution right today, their 
willingness to continue this forbearance in the future is largely dependent on a 
continuing alignment between their enforcement incentives and revenue 
streams.
167
 As the transaction costs of enforcement decrease, through 
assignments or otherwise, and copyright owners experiment with newer 
revenue streams, it is possible to envision a future in which lawsuits against 
individual resellers of infringing products become a viable enforcement 
mechanism, and perhaps an independent source of revenue.
168
 With copyright’s 
allowance for a minimum amount of statutory damages without any proof of 
harm,
169
 copyright owners could come to see few disadvantages, if any, in 
abandoning their tolerance for such individual instances of infringement and 
instead attempt to deter such behavior through lawsuits or the threat of such 
actions.
170
 Indeed, in a few industries, copyright owners have begun 
experimenting with this approach, even though the practice is yet to become 
widespread.
171
 Were this to occur, the prior enforcement equilibrium would be 
disrupted, and the net effect on the marketplace for used goods containing 
protected expression is certain to be a reduction in trade. Marketability, in other 
words, would be impacted directly. 
In short, the same set of concerns that motivated the common law to 
develop the good faith purchaser doctrine applies with equal, if not greater, 
 
 165. Id. at 1366–67 (majority opinion). 
 166. Tim Wu has characterized such forbearance as “tolerated use.” See Tim Wu, Tolerated 
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force to the principal settings where consumers interact with copyright law. 
The challenge therefore lies in developing a mechanism that introduces such 
protection into copyright law without impinging on copyright law’s core ideals. 
III. 
GOOD FAITH PURCHASER PROTECTION IN COPYRIGHT LAW 
Having demonstrated how copyright law came to ignore any form of 
protection for good faith purchasers, which it subsumed under its elimination of 
the innocent infringer defense, this Part moves to the prescriptive. It argues for 
the development of a good faith purchaser doctrine for copyright law, drawing 
on the core rationale for the doctrine at common law and copyright law’s own 
analytical and normative underpinnings. Part III.A begins by laying the 
groundwork for the doctrine by describing how copyright law’s current 
framework contains three important analytical ideas that may be fruitfully 
synthesized into full-blown good faith purchaser protection in copyright law. 
Part III.B then pieces these analytical ideas together into an altogether new 
good faith purchaser doctrine in copyright law, and works through the new 
doctrine’s consequences and implications. 
A. Analytic Precepts 
While copyright law may deserve a good faith purchaser doctrine owing 
to the risk that consumers routinely face in relation to infringing articles and 
the reach of the distribution right, the solution does not inhere in simplistically 
transplanting the common law doctrine over to copyright. Copyright law 
concerns itself with a host of additional considerations that are alien to the 
common law, including the need to provide copyright owners with sufficient 
protection in the marketplace to ensure that its promise of exclusive rights 
continues to operate as an incentive for further creativity.
172
 Successfully 
developing good faith purchaser protection in copyright law will entail 
integration of the doctrine’s core considerations from the common law with 
copyright’s foundational ideals, both analytical and normative. All the same, 
embedded within the workings of the copyright system—and all too often 
ignored—is a series of important analytical ideas which, when taken together, 
suggest that copyright’s principal concerns might indeed be rendered fully 
compatible with good faith purchaser protection. This Section identifies three 
such ideas and lays the groundwork for an independent good faith purchaser 
doctrine in copyright law, which Part III.B develops. 
 
 172. See generally COPYRIGHT OFFICE, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF 
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1. The Subsidiarity of the Distribution Right 
As a purely conceptual matter, copyright infringement relies extensively 
on the requirement of copying. Indeed, as some put it, “absent copying, there 
can be no infringement of copyright.”
173
 Copying is thus a prerequisite for any 
infringement of copyright’s exclusive rights, with the exception of the public 
performance and public display rights.
174
 While the distribution right has 
always been a part of the copyright owner’s arsenal, it too depends on copying 
as a functional prerequisite, owing to the simple reality that the right relates to 
distributions (or vending) of copies of the protected work. Consequently, as a 
historical matter, violations of the distribution right were usually accompanied 
by violations of the reproduction right, even if different parties were 
responsible for them.
175
 The 1976 Act continued this dependence, by centering 
the distribution right around “copies” of the copyrighted work, understood in 
turn to mean the material objects in which the work is fixed.
176
 Since the 
creation of those copies without authorization from the copyright owner would 
amount to a violation of the reproduction right, the distribution right is 
therefore analytically dependent on the reproduction right. This explains why 
in the first two decades following the passage of the 1976 Act, hardly any 
plaintiffs “alleged violation of the distribution right apart from violation of the 
reproduction right.”
177
 
With copyright’s allowance for the complete divisibility of its bundle of 
rights, however, the distribution and reproduction rights can come to vest in 
different owners.
178
 In addition, the advent of digital technology has ensured 
that today, a work may be distributed by individuals without their making a 
copy of the work themselves. While these developments have downplayed the 
adjudicative dependency of the distribution right on the act of copying, the 
analytical dependence of the distribution right on reproduction continues. It is 
only in the exceptionally rare situation that one encounters a violation of the 
distribution right without an analytically prior—and identifiable—violation of 
the reproduction right, be it by the same party violating the distribution right, or 
someone else.
179
 As a consequence, the distribution right is subsidiary to the 
reproduction right as an analytical and practical matter. An action for a 
violation of the distribution right will usually also allow an action for a 
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violation of the reproduction right, especially in relation to tangible 
embodiments (as opposed to digital products).
180
 
On occasion, courts have translated this subsidiarity into practical 
significance. A few early decisions under the 1909 Act relied on a principle of 
secondary liability to give effect to this subsidiarity.
181
 In situations where 
violations of both the reproduction and distribution rights were claimed, but 
against different defendants, this principle allowed courts to deviate from the 
default approach of joint and several liability and instead hold the violator of 
the reproduction right primarily liable for the entirety of the damages. The 
violator of the distribution right then became secondarily liable only if the 
award could not be satisfied through the primary liability.
182
 The motivating 
logic here was that the distributor’s liability was causally connected to the 
copier-manufacturer’s actions, especially when the distributor had no 
knowledge of the infringing nature of the copy being distributed. Very few 
cases have since extended this idea further.
183
 All the same, it highlights how 
the idea of subsidiarity can be fruitfully incorporated into the structure of 
liability for violations of the distribution right. 
More than just a legal concept, the idea of subsidiarity also embodies an 
economic logic that courts have usefully employed in expanding the domain of 
indirect liability for copyright infringement. Copyright’s doctrine of 
contributory infringement is premised on the idea that in numerous situations, 
one party higher up in the chain of causation, such as a device manufacturer, is 
in a significantly better position—both as a matter of cost and technological 
ability—to control infringement than others lower down the chain. The 
upstream party is in effect the “cheapest cost avoider” of the infringement.
184
 A 
very similar logic is at play in the principle of subsidiarity, where the 
manufacturer, who reproduces the protected expression in the infringing article 
and then distributes it on the market, is in a significantly better position than 
downstream purchasers or resellers to control the harm produced. The 
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manufacturer’s initial violation of the reproduction right is thus causally prior 
to, and facilitative of, the subsequent violations. The subsidiarity of the 
distribution right to analytically prior reproductions is thus but another way of 
operationalizing the cheapest cost avoider logic. 
2. Courts and Declarations of Infringement 
The role of courts within the overall skein of the copyright system is 
largely underappreciated. While courts play a very important role in the actual 
making of copyright law and policy,
185
 they also play an equally central role in 
the internal workings of the system. While patent and trademark law involve a 
formal grant of rights by an agency following a review of the applicant’s claim 
to exclusivity, the copyright system is formality-free in nature—meaning that a 
copyright owner obtains protection, i.e., exclusive rights, independent of any 
formal review by an agency, the Copyright Office, or otherwise.
186
 Current law 
requires a plaintiff to register the work with the Copyright Office any time 
prior to the commencement of a lawsuit for infringement.
187
 While such 
registration constitutes prima facie evidence of the copyright’s validity,
188
 
courts almost never defer to the registration unless both parties stipulate to its 
validity. It thus falls almost entirely to courts to delineate the scope and 
coverage of the plaintiff’s rights for the first time during an individual case, 
especially if the work contains both protectable and unprotectable elements. 
Determining the scope and coverage of copyright in a work is an issue 
indelibly entangled with the question of infringement. It is often only during a 
court’s determination of whether the defendant copied protected material that 
the logically prior question of whether particular material within the work was 
in fact protected gets addressed at all.
189
 Given the intricate connection between 
infringement and scope, the court’s signaling role within the copyright system 
remains critical, albeit unappreciated. A judicial finding of infringement or 
noninfringement serves as public notice—for the first time—of (1) the 
existence of valid copyright protection over the work, (2) the scope and extent 
of such protection, and (3) the defendant’s violation of such protection. While 
we tend to think of (3) as the principal function of an infringement action, the 
reality remains that (1) and (2) are of equal, if not greater, significance to the 
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working of the system. This is especially so, given the fundamentally in rem 
nature of the copyright entitlement, and the law’s imposition of a private law-
driven duty “not to copy” on all others without the copyright owner’s 
authorization.
190
 
To the extent that the copyright system seeks to guide individuals to plan 
their activities in a way that doesn’t infringe protected works, notice becomes a 
critical issue.
191
 Courts and copyright litigation therefore play a central role in 
alleviating the informational deficit produced by the system’s abolition of 
formalities, a reality that is often ignored. Infringement determinations—
whether for a plaintiff or defendant—serve the all-important role of providing 
notice to actors, even if it comes significantly later than would be ideal, i.e., a 
judicial finding of infringement dates back to the commencement of 
infringement, and applies not just on a prospective basis but retroactively as 
well. At the time of the actual infringement, a defendant may therefore have 
little notice of such infringement. Since knowledge is not a prerequisite for 
liability, the notice that the judicial determination provides emerges far too late 
for that specific defendant. The law recognizes this reality by providing 
declaratory judgments on noninfringement, which parties frequently opt for.
192
 
Notice of actual infringement—from a judicial determination—is thus of 
no obvious utility in proceedings relating to that very act of infringement. It 
remains of extreme utility, however, in situations where the legality of the 
principal or original act of infringement isn’t the main issue addressed, but 
instead the collateral (and downstream) consequences of such infringement are. 
Good faith purchaser protection represents one such collateral consequence, 
insofar as it is concerned with title over infringing articles and purchasers’ 
powers in relation to such articles that are acquired without actual notice of 
infringement. Copyright law might thus fruitfully internalize the central role of 
courts in generating actual and constructive knowledge of infringement in this 
domain. 
3. Reassigning Title to Infringing Articles 
While copyright law does not contain a good faith purchaser doctrine, it 
does provide remedies that empower courts to directly affect parties’ relative 
claims over “infringing articles.”
193
 As part of a final judgment or decree, 
section 503(b) of the 1976 Copyright Act authorizes courts to “order the 
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destruction or other reasonable disposition” of copies made in violation of the 
copyright owner’s exclusive rights.
194
 The remedy of destruction or forfeiture 
has been in existence since the late-nineteenth century.
195
 It derives from the 
recognition that infringing copies or articles could have the effect of interfering 
with the market for the copyright owner’s original versions, thereby impeding 
the limited market exclusivity that was a legitimate part of the copyright 
bargain. Eliminating such infringing copies from the market, when feasible, has 
thus come to be seen as an option for plaintiffs once an infringement is found, 
and which courts may award on a discretionary basis. 
While destruction is certainly the remedy most frequently sought under 
section 503(b), the legislative history accompanying the 1976 Act makes it 
abundantly clear that Congress included the phrase “other reasonable 
disposition” in the statute with the idea that courts could use their discretion to 
craft other remedial measures relating to copies as they saw appropriate in any 
given case.
196
 The House Report notes that a court might “order the infringing 
articles sold, delivered to the plaintiff, or disposed of in some other way that 
would avoid needless waste and best serve the ends of justice.”
197
 The 
equitable and discretionary nature of the remedy thus gives courts significant 
flexibility to determine how title over infringing copies may be dealt with in 
light of the equities of the case involved. 
Courts have exercised this discretion in a variety of ways. One court, for 
example, ordered the parties to negotiate with each other in an effort to see if 
the plaintiff would purchase the infringing copies from the defendant.
198
 In 
another case, a court granted the plaintiff the right to have all the infringing 
copies destroyed, but then offered the plaintiff additional compensation for a 
waiver of that right.
199
 And in a few other cases, courts have ordered the 
defendant to deliver the infringing copies into the possession of the plaintiff, 
thereby effecting an involuntary transfer of title between the parties.
200
 
In the exercise of their remedial discretion in this area, courts are well 
aware of the reality that they are reassigning title over the infringing articles in 
 
 194. Id. § 503(b). 
 195. For a useful discussion of this history, see Alexander, supra note 140, at 482–85. 
 196. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 160 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5776 
(“Section 503(b) of the bill would make this provision more flexible by giving the court discretion to 
order ‘destruction or other reasonable disposition[’] of the articles found to be infringing.”). 
 197. Id. 
 198. Encyclopaedia Britannica Educ. Corp. v. Crooks, 542 F. Supp. 1156, 1188 (W.D.N.Y. 
1982) (“[T]he parties should be afforded some opportunity to meet and determine whether some type 
of purchasing or other agreement can be reached concerning the collection of existing works before 
the court orders the erasure of any infringing copies.”). 
 199. Jones Bros. Co. v. Underkoffler, No. 1067, 1937 WL 25996, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 6, 1937) 
(“The court is of the opinion that these sums should he [sic] reduced to $500.00 for damages and 
$500.00 for waiver of the right to destroy the infringing memorial. . . .”). 
 200. See, e.g., Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 313 (2d Cir. 1992) (discussing the “turn-over 
order”). 
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question, despite copyright law’s attempt to separate ownership of the article 
embodying the work from ownership over the work itself. It is perhaps for this 
reason that a few courts have declared that the remedy of destruction or 
forfeiture is unavailable against innocent third parties who acquire the 
infringing article without engaging in any overt act of infringement 
themselves.
201
 In Foreign & Domestic Music Corp. v. Licht,
202
 a case under the 
analogous provisions of the 1909 Act, the Second Circuit denied the plaintiff 
such a remedy against a defendant company that had merely acquired the 
infringing copies at issue from another company that had unlawfully made 
them. Judge Learned Hand thus observed in the case: 
The plaintiff appears to suppose that Eureka Productions, Inc., which 
produced the films and from which the Wyngate Company obtained 
them, had no title to the “sound tracks,” and that the Wyngate 
Company could therefore get no right in them. That is not true. It is 
indeed true that while they were in the hands of Eureka Productions, 
Inc. they were subject to be impounded, and if the plaintiff recovered 
judgment against the infringer, they were subject to forfeiture and 
destruction. . . . The remedy of forfeiture and destruction is given only 
against an infringer, and the Wyngate Company was not an infringer 
so far as concerned the making of the “sound tracks.” True, it was a 
second act of infringement by Eureka Productions, Inc. to sell—
“vend”—the “sound tracks,” if it did sell them to the Wyngate 
Company; but, even so, it was not an infringement for the Wyngate 
Company to buy them; one does not infringe a copyright by buying an 
infringing copy of the “work,” though the buyer will infringe, if in his 
turn he sells the copy he has bought . . . .
203
 
Here, Judge Hand makes several important points. First, the holder of an 
infringing copy—even if they are the unauthorized producer or maker of that 
copy—is not automatically denied title to it merely because it is infringing in 
nature. Second, title to the copy may only be denied (through a forfeiture or 
destruction) upon a finding of infringement. Third, and as a result, an innocent 
purchaser cannot be denied good title to the copy, since the purchaser is not an 
infringer under copyright law. All the same, if that innocent purchaser should 
choose to sell that copy to others, it could trigger the remedy of title 
reallocation. While the 1976 Act does not codify this limitation,
204
 the same 
logic has been understood to apply to the terms of the 1976 Act as well.
205
 
 
 201. 5 NIMMER, supra note 14, § 14.08. 
 202. See, e.g., Foreign & Domestic Music Corp. v. Licht, 196 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1952). 
 203. Id. at 629. 
 204. See Alexander, supra note 140, at 489 (noting how during the drafting of the 1976 Act 
Congress “quietly dropped” any reference to this principle). 
 205. See Societe Civile Succession Richard Guino v. Int’l Found. for Anticancer Drug 
Discovery, 460 F. Supp. 2d 1105, 1109 (D. Ariz. 2006); 5 NIMMER, supra note 14, § 14.08 
(suggesting that this interpretation is “clear”). Indeed, the principle was seriously considered for 
inclusion in the 1976 Act, with a few draft bills suggesting codification. See William S. Strauss, Study 
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Copyright law thus provides for destruction of an infringing article, or a 
reallocation of title to it, as remedies only when defendants have themselves 
engaged in infringement. Where there is no act of infringement, the possessor 
of the article retains good title over it. Nevertheless, this creates a paradox. If 
the ability to alienate the article is taken as a central component of good title, 
then it makes little sense to speak of title in such an article since the possessor 
becomes an infringer—subject to title reallocation—the moment a transfer is 
made. The only rational and practical way of solving this paradox involves 
bifurcating the rights of a purchaser and seller in relation to infringing articles, 
using the flexibility afforded by the statute (and equity) to courts in this area. 
B. A Good Faith Purchaser Doctrine for Copyright 
As we have seen, copyright law would stand to benefit significantly from 
the introduction of some measure of protection for good faith purchasers. 
While a mechanistic transplantation of the doctrine from the common law to 
copyright law ought to be avoided, this does not imply that copyright law needs 
to develop every last element of the doctrine independently. To the contrary, 
there are elements of the common law doctrine that copyright law could 
incorporate into its own formulation, eliminating the need for courts and parties 
to grapple with the initial uncertainties that invariably accompany the creation 
of a new rule.
206
 
Since the objective of the doctrine is to protect “good faith” purchasers 
“for value” of articles containing infringing copies, copyright law could retain 
the common law’s understanding of when the good faith requirement is 
satisfied, and what a purchase for value entails.
207
 Given that the same set of 
consumers are the intended beneficiaries of protection under both doctrines, 
retaining the common law’s understanding of good faith—on the assumption 
that it builds on and informs prevalent marketplace norms—makes perfect 
sense. A purchaser of an infringing article would thus be understood to have 
acted in good faith when they had no actual, implied, or constructive 
knowledge of the infringing nature of the article at the time of its purchase. 
This is identical to how the common law standard relates to other kinds of 
taints on the seller’s title. The same is true for the idea of a transaction of value, 
where copyright law could outsource the question of consideration to state 
contract law directly governing the actual transaction in question. 
The most crucial modification that copyright law will require is the notion 
of voidable title, the primary concept around which the good faith purchaser 
 
No. 24: Remedies Other than Damages for Copyright Infringement, in COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, 
supra note 115, at 111, 122–23 (1959). 
 206. For a general overview of the problems associated with interdoctrinal borrowing, see 
Edward Rock & Michael Wachter, Dangerous Liaisons: Corporate Law, Trust Law, and 
Interdoctrinal Legal Transplants, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 651 (2002). 
 207. See generally supra Part I. 
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doctrine came to revolve in the common law. Since the primary situations 
where the void/voidable distinction emerged related to taints in the actual sale, 
extending this concept and its legal consequences to the context of an 
infringing article will require paying close attention to copyright law’s 
treatment of infringement and its consequences in relation to the notion of title 
in the article embodying an infringing copy. The discussion below addresses 
this nuance while also examining the primary instances where a new good faith 
purchaser doctrine for copyright law might work. 
The doctrine would work in the main by ensuring that a good faith 
purchaser for value of an infringing article (i.e., an object embodying an 
infringing copy) obtains good title to it. This would in turn produce three 
interrelated consequences: (1) until a judicial finding of infringement, the 
person responsible for an infringing article (i.e., the manufacturer or copier 
who is responsible for the reproduction) holds voidable rather than void title in 
it; (2) a good faith purchase from someone with voidable title results in good 
title, which may be alienated at any time without liability for infringement 
(conversely, a purchase from someone with void title does not result in a 
transfer of title and a subsequent sale can trigger liability); and (3) subsequent 
purchasers from a good faith purchaser similarly obtain good title, and may 
further transfer it onto others without inviting liability for copyright 
infringement. Each of these is examined more fully below. 
1. Void and Voidable Title in Relation to Infringement 
As noted previously, good faith purchaser protection hinges on 
recognizing the wrongdoer in question as having voidable, rather than void, 
title in the object because it enables them to pass good title onto the good faith 
purchaser. Leaving aside for the moment violations of copyright’s distribution 
right and focusing instead on the act of producing or making an infringing 
copy, the question becomes one of determining how the law ought to treat a 
manufacturer’s ownership interest in the infringing article embodying the 
unauthorized copy. Returning to our hypothetical involving Joe and Frank, the 
issue is the nature of Honda USA’s title in a Honda Civic that it manufactures, 
which incorporates unauthorized copies of Toyota’s software code, thereby 
infringing Toyota’s reproduction right. 
Early cases refused to treat the title in such infringing articles as vesting 
with the copyright owner, even by analogy to the doctrine of accession. The 
early English case Colburn v. Simms considered the question at length as a 
matter of common law and concluded that “it does not necessarily follow . . . 
that one who writes or prints upon his own paper the composition of another 
has thereby so mixed his property with the property of the author whose work 
he has copied that he has lost his original title to the material . . . .”
208
 Most 
 
 208. Colburn v. Simms (1843) 67 Eng. Rep. 224 (Ch.) 229; 2 Hare 543, 554–55. 
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U.S. courts came to adopt this position, and held that, at least prior to a final 
judgment of infringement, a copyright owner had no title to the infringing 
article that would allow an action for replevin to be brought at common law.
209
 
Once an infringement has been adjudicated however, the copyright 
statute—both then and now—has allowed courts to grant the copyright owner 
the remedy of forfeiture, thereby implying that a final judgment affects some 
alteration in the title to infringing articles.
210
 While a final judgment does not of 
course automatically vest title in the copyright owner, especially since the 
remedy is discretionary, it may more appropriately be understood as having the 
effect of invalidating the defendant-manufacturer’s title in the infringing 
article. 
It is in the above distinction that we find a mechanism for parsing the 
infringer-manufacturer’s title in the infringing article. Until a final judgment of 
infringement against the manufacturer, a manufacturer of an infringing article 
must be seen as having voidable title in that article, and after such a judgment, 
that title is rendered void. Not only is this position in keeping with the way in 
which courts have historically treated title to the infringing article as part of the 
remedy of forfeiture but it also comports with the law’s reasons for 
distinguishing between voidable and void title, discussed previously. 
The act of making an infringing article, while a direct infraction of the 
reproduction right, is nowhere near the crime of theft in terms of its gravity and 
social harm, and thus does not justify immediately tainting the infringer’s title 
in the physical embodiment of the unauthorized copy. This is evidenced by the 
fact that the law does not make the simple act of infringement a crime unless 
willfully committed.
211
 
Nor is the mere act of making an infringing article one from which an 
illegality can be directly ascertained so as to vitiate the possessor’s title. As 
discussed, the crime of theft was seen to do this, but only when the theft 
(larceny) was overt, i.e., direct and nonconsensual.
212
 Such a taking was seen to 
be direct enough, and since it required no additional evidence or inferences to 
know whether it was unlawful ex ante, it was deemed to taint the entire 
process. When the law expanded to cover thefts of a more technical nature, 
where such an ex ante determination of illegality became impossible until 
 
 209. Am. Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 146 F. 375, 375 (2d Cir. 1906), aff’d, 207 U.S. 284 
(1907); Hegeman v. Springer, 110 F. 374, 375 (2d Cir. 1901), aff’d, 189 U.S. 505 (1903); Gustin v. 
Record Pub. Co., 127 F. 603, 605 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1904); Rinehart v. Smith, 121 F. 148, 148 (C.C.E.D. 
Pa. 1903). But see Morrison v. Pettibone, 87 F. 330, 332 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1897) (taking the contrary view 
and holding that an infringement gave the copyright owner title over the infringing article). 
 210. 17 U.S.C. § 503(b) (2012). 
 211. Id. § 506(a)(1). Further, the mere act of reproduction or distribution, even when done for a 
commercial end, does not produce an inference of such willfulness, which needs to be independently 
proven. Id. § 506(a)(2) (“[E]vidence of reproduction or distribution of a copyrighted work, by itself, 
shall not be sufficient to establish willful infringement of a copyright.”). 
 212. See U.C.C. § 2-403 cmt. 2 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1962) (refusing to 
extend the theft exception in good faith purchaser doctrine to the “extended law of larceny”). 
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judicial determination, the mere categorization of the act as a theft or larceny 
was taken to be insufficient to vitiate title on its face.
213
 The act of making an 
infringing article belongs to the latter category. An infringing article consists of 
a material object into which the protected work is embedded without the 
copyright owner’s authorization. As long as the maker has valid rights in that 
object, the unlawfulness in the making is impossible to determine ex ante.
214
 
The illegality is therefore of a “technical” nature, which requires proof of 
additional elements—one precisely of the kind that produces voidable rather 
than void title. 
Under copyright’s good faith purchaser doctrine, then, a person who 
produces an article that contains potentially infringing expression obtains 
voidable title in it. When a court finds the making of that article to be 
infringing, i.e., as a violation of the reproduction right, that title becomes void. 
The effect of the judicial finding is that the manufacturer’s subsequent transfers 
of the infringing article invite potential civil and criminal liability, as well as 
additional liability for contempt. Since the original defendant’s title may be 
considered to be altogether avoided through such a judicial order, all 
subsequent purchasers obtain no protection whatsoever. 
To the extent that certain kinds of illegal copying are rather obvious on 
their very face—for example, the manufacturing of counterfeits and their sale 
at a significantly lower price—courts would still be empowered to deny 
purchasers the benefit of protection by finding the element of “good faith” to 
be altogether missing. This would be in keeping with how courts approach 
similar issues in other contexts where a taint is apparent on the very face of the 
transaction. In these situations, courts continue to treat the title in question as 
voidable, and not void, but fault the purchaser for willfully disregarding the 
circumstances of the purchase.
215
 The same approach might be fruitfully 
employed in instances of egregious counterfeits, on a case-by-case basis. 
The analysis thus far contemplates a situation where the infringing article 
is still in the possession of its maker at the time of the judicial determination of 
infringement. In many cases, however, the manufacturer will have sold the 
article to a third party before the judgment, such that it is the third party and not 
the manufacturer who is in possession at the time of the judicial determination. 
 
 213. Id. 
 214. As noted earlier, the act here resembles situations involving the doctrine of accession, 
where a person mistakenly transforms the property of another such that the contributions of both 
become inseparable. Here, the law determines the parties’ relative entitlements by reference to their 
intentions and motives. As noted earlier, the common law chose not to adopt this approach with regard 
to copyright. See Colburn v. Simms (1843) 67 Eng. Rep. 224 (Ch.) 229; 2 Hare 543, 554–55. For a 
general overview of the doctrine of accession, see Earl C. Arnold, The Law of Accession of Personal 
Property, 22 COLUM. L. REV. 103 (1922). 
 215. See, e.g., Kotis v. Nowlin Jewelry, Inc., 844 S.W.2d 920, 924 (Tex. App. 1992) (“An 
unreasonably low price is evidence the buyer knows the goods are stolen.”). 
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The next two Sections consider copyright’s good faith purchaser protection 
under these circumstances. 
2. Good Faith Purchasers of Infringing Articles 
The discussion thus far has focused on the title of the maker or 
manufacturer of the infringing article in that article, before and after a judicial 
finding of infringement, based on a violation of the reproduction right. In most 
situations, however, the manufacturer responsible for the production of the 
infringing article (i.e., who has violated the reproduction right) isn’t in 
possession of the infringing article at the time the judicial finding of 
infringement is made. In addition, the person who is in actual possession of the 
object is ordinarily a good faith purchaser from the manufacturer who produced 
it. The question then is how the law should treat such purchasers, who obtain 
the infringing article before any judicial determination, and who remain in 
possession of the article when the determination is made—even though the 
judicial proceeding itself doesn’t directly impact them (i.e., since they 
themselves have performed no infringing activity).
216
 
As noted, the person who makes the infringing article would, under 
copyright’s good faith purchaser rule, have voidable title in it at the time that it 
is transferred to the good faith purchaser, since no judicial determination of 
infringement exists at the time.
217
 As a result, the good faith purchaser obtains 
good title to the infringing article through the purchase. Indeed, recognizing 
clear and unencumbered title in good faith purchasers who obtain an object 
from a seller with voidable title to it remains the very raison d’être for the 
doctrine. Consequently, the same treatment should be afforded to good faith 
purchasers by copyright law. 
Nevertheless, it is crucial to unpack what “good title” means for a good 
faith purchaser under copyright law. Even under existing law, a good faith 
purchaser can retain possession of the infringing article without any 
interference.
218
 A judicial determination that the object is an infringing article 
would not alter that since copyright’s remedies relating to forfeiture and 
involuntary title transfer do not affect innocent purchasers who aren’t infringers 
themselves.
219
 And the judicial determination itself only directly affects the 
manufacturer of the article. The principal modification would lie in completely 
immunizing a good faith purchaser from liability for infringement for further 
transfers of the object to others. “Good title” to an object must encompass the 
 
 216. The reference to “judicial determination” here is exclusively to a judicial proceeding 
brought against the manufacturer or maker of the infringing article in which the manufacturer or maker 
as defendant is found to have infringed, at minimum, the copyright owner’s reproduction right. No 
subsequent purchaser is a party to the lawsuit, since that purchaser was not involved in the act of 
manufacturing the article. 
 217. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 218. See supra Part I.B.3. 
 219. 5 NIMMER, supra note 14, § 14.08. 
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ability to alienate it on the market without liability, which renders such 
immunity a logical consequence of recognizing valid title in the good faith 
purchaser. As noted previously, under current law a good faith purchaser of an 
infringing article risks liability for copyright infringement during such a 
transfer by violating the copyright owner’s distribution right.
220
 
Under the new doctrine, a good faith purchaser who buys an infringing 
article from a seller with voidable title in it obtains good title. This entails 
immunity from liability for further transfers of the article both before and after 
the court finds the manufacturer liable for infringement and designates the 
objects involved as infringing articles. The good faith purchaser can now 
transfer valid title to other third parties without the law treating such transfers 
as a violation of the public distribution right. 
In essence, this doctrine works as a modified version of pre-1909 
copyright law’s innocent seller exception to infringement.
221
 Yet it is 
significantly different in two important respects. First, it applies only to a good 
faith purchaser, and thus focuses on the behavior of the party at the time of the 
purchase rather than at the time of the sale.
222
 It matters little that, between the 
good faith purchaser’s acquisition of the object and its subsequent resale, the 
purchaser learns of the infringing nature of the article—or that a court has 
determined its status as such. More importantly, it would not extend to a 
defendant who did not obtain the infringing article through an arm’s length 
purchase. Thus, acquisitions through mere gifts would be excluded, as would 
sales by retailers who obtain the articles as mere consignees from the 
manufacturer, since they would not be transactions “for value,” and thus 
beyond the market-driven rationale for the doctrine. Second, the protection 
would operate as an affirmative defense that the defendant needs to assert, 
rather than as part of the prima facie case.
223
 This would ensure that the 
protection kicks in only when the good faith purchaser is sued for copyright 
infringement, leaving unaffected the copyright owner’s burden in ordinary 
infringement actions against sellers. 
All the same, one might worry that by eliminating liability (for violations 
of the distribution right) when good faith purchasers seek to resell the 
infringing article, the copyright owner’s legitimate interests will be 
significantly impacted. As we saw earlier, this was a concern that motivated 
Congress to eliminate any protection for innocent sellers under the current 
Act.
224
 A closer scrutiny of the immunity being offered under this new rule 
reveals that copyright owners are unlikely to have their interests affected in any 
 
 220. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2012). 
 221. See supra text accompanying notes 107–13. 
 222. Under the innocent seller exception, it remained unclear when the seller’s lack of 
knowledge mattered. The plain language of the statute suggested that it was knowledge at the time of 
the sale, rather than the purchase. See Copyright Act of 1790, § 2, 1 Stat. 124, 124 (1790). 
 223. See generally text accompanying notes 207–216. 
 224. See supra text accompanying notes 113–19. 
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significant way. When an infringing article is made and distributed, a copyright 
owner’s interests are believed to lie in (1) obtaining compensation for any 
economic harm suffered,
225
 (2) disgorging any profits wrongfully made from 
the infringement,
226
 and (3) taking the infringing articles out of circulation.
227
 
Each of these interests can obtain sufficient protection even without requiring a 
good faith purchaser to be found liable. 
Under the formulation suggested here, the copyright owner would still be 
able to commence an action against the manufacturer of the infringing article 
for both the copying of protected expression and for first introducing the 
infringing copy onto market. The good faith purchaser obtains the article only 
because the manufacturer chose to transfer it on the open market to the good 
faith purchaser. The defendant-manufacturer is therefore likely to be in 
violation of both the reproduction and distribution rights. Any possible 
economic harm to the plaintiff is directly attributable to the defendant-
manufacturer’s actions. All of the plaintiff’s lost revenues—the primary means 
of computing economic harm for a damages recovery
228
—can be legitimately 
recovered from the defendant-manufacturer. It is hard to conceive of any lost 
revenue that the copyright owner suffers that might be attributable exclusively 
to the good faith purchaser but not the manufacturer. While some copyright 
owners may find a benefit to commencing separate actions against different 
defendants, this alone does not suggest that reducing such actions poses a threat 
to the copyright owner’s interests. 
As for attributable profits, in most cases, resales by good faith purchasers 
are unlikely to involve significant profits that are worthy of being disgorged 
separately, rather than as part of the economic harm suffered by the copyright 
owner—meaning that they could be factored into a court’s award of damages 
for the violation of the reproduction right.
229
 
This then leaves us with the copyright owner’s interest in ensuring that the 
infringing articles are taken out of circulation, so as to avoid diluting or 
curtailing the market for the originals. While this is certainly a legitimate 
interest, it too is nonetheless constrained by the requirement that the remedy of 
destruction or forfeiture cannot be applied to infringing articles that are in the 
possession of innocent parties.
230
 As a result, the remedy is most suited to 
actions directly against an infringing manufacturer who is still in possession of 
 
 225. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 161 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5777 
(“Damages are awarded to compensate the copyright owner for losses from the infringement, and 
profits are awarded to prevent the infringer from unfairly benefiting from a wrongful act.”). 
 226. Id. 
 227. For a useful history of this remedy, see Ruth C. Trussell, A Reappraisal of the Impounding 
and Destruction Provisions of the Copyright Law: Sections 101(c) and (d) and the Rules of Procedure, 
26 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. 95 (1976). 
 228. 5 NIMMER, supra note 14, § 14.02. 
 229. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 161 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5777. 
 230. See supra note 205 and accompanying text. 
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the infringing articles. Though current law makes an innocent reseller an 
infringer, it is inconceivable how this remedy might be exercised against that 
reseller since the “distribution,” which is a prerequisite for the infringement 
itself, involves the defendant-infringer parting with title and possession of the 
infringing article. While in theory the remedy may allow the copyright owner 
to seek the forfeiture or involuntary transfer of any remaining infringing 
articles in the possession of the reseller, it does nothing to take the already-
distributed articles out of circulation. Consequently, immunizing good faith 
purchasers from liability will have little effect on this particular interest of the 
copyright owner. Again, insofar as they seek to take infringing articles out of 
circulation, the copyright owner is better off going after the source, i.e., the 
manufacturer. 
The idea of subsidiarity discussed earlier provides a useful way in which 
all of the copyright owner’s interests can continue to be served—by simply 
emphasizing and enhancing recovery from the defendant-manufacturer instead 
of the good faith purchaser. In some ways this formulation takes the idea of 
“secondary liability”
231
—developed by one early court—a step further by now 
making defendant-manufacturers of infringing copies primarily liable, instead 
of good faith purchasers, for the economic consequences of such infringing 
copies. Since the idea is not precluded by the terms of the statute or its 
legislative history, the move is unlikely to be problematic.
232
 
3. The Shelter Rule 
The final category of purchasers who might obtain an interest in the 
infringing article are purchasers who obtain the infringing article from a good 
faith purchaser after a judicial determination of infringement has been made 
against the manufacturer of the article.
233
 Since their purchase is after the 
judicial finding of infringement, which is now a matter of public record, they 
may be presumed to have actual notice of the article’s infringing character. 
Consequently, it is questionable whether they would qualify for good faith 
purchaser protection themselves since a lack of diligence about the infringing 
 
 231. Detective Comics, Inc. v. Bruns Publ’ns, 28 F. Supp. 399, 401 (S.D.N.Y. 1939), decree 
modified, 111 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1940). 
 232. An objection to the requirement that the copyright owner bring an action against the 
manufacturer rather than against the good faith purchaser is the three-year statute of limitations. See 17 
U.S.C. § 507 (2012). Since the manufacturer’s infringing actions take place well before the good faith 
purchaser’s resale, it might be seen as imposing an undue burden on the copyright owner. However, 
this concern is easily remedied by incorporating a “discovery rule” approach to the statute of 
limitations, or by commencing the tolling of the limitation period based on a “duty of diligence” that is 
imposed on the plaintiff. See generally 3 NIMMER, supra note 14, § 12.05[B][2]. 
 233. Note that here we are not concerned with purchasers who obtain the article directly from 
the manufacturer, since after a finding of infringement the manufacturer’s title in the infringing articles 
becomes void and the manufacturer is therefore incapable of transferring any title to a purchaser. 
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nature of the article in question might render their good faith nonexistent at the 
time of their purchase.
234
 
The common law confronted this question during the evolution of the 
good faith purchaser doctrine. Typically, after the sale to a good faith 
purchaser, the original owner of the goods in question obtains a civil judgment 
alleging fraud, misrepresentation, or the like, against the party with voidable 
title. Subsequent purchasers from the good faith purchaser are then likely to 
have knowledge or notice of the original defect at the time of their purchase, 
rendering them ineligible for good faith purchaser status themselves. These 
purchasers may not be perfectly innocent, yet to call their title into question 
runs the risk of rendering the good faith purchaser’s title functionally useless. 
Without protection for subsequent purchasers, good faith purchasers are 
unlikely to further alienate their property. To ameliorate this, the common law 
developed the “shelter rule,” under which a transferee from a good faith 
purchaser obtains good title, regardless of whether the transferee qualifies for 
good faith protection.
235
 In describing the shelter rule, one court observed: 
As a general rule, if one is entitled to protection as a bona fide 
purchaser, he may convey a good title to a subsequent purchaser 
irrespective of notice on the part of the latter of defects in the title; in 
other words, a purchaser with notice from a bona fide purchaser 
without notice succeeds to the rights of the latter and occupies the 
position of a bona fide purchaser. The reason for this is to prevent a 
stagnation of property, and because the first purchaser, being entitled 
to hold and enjoy, must be equally entitled to sell.
236
 
Without the protection of the “shelter rule,” common law courts were 
concerned that property would stagnate by remaining with the good faith 
purchaser indefinitely, thereby also eviscerating the good faith purchaser’s title 
of its functional significance by preventing further alienation of the property. 
The shelter rule is crucial to good faith purchaser protection at common law 
and essential to its very functioning.
237
 At its core, the shelter rule is more 
 
 234. Such diligence is commonly required under the common law’s traditional good faith 
purchaser standard. See, e.g., City of Rio Rancho v. Amrep Sw. Inc., 260 P.3d 414, 423 (N.M. 2011) 
(observing that “due diligence, [which] would have led to a knowledge of the infirmities” is an 
essential element of good faith purchaser protection); Swanson v. Swanson, 796 N.W.2d 614, 617 
(N.D. 2011); Ojeda de Toca v. Wise, 748 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tex. 1988). The idea of “diligent inquiry” 
was also central to the concern with allowing innocent sellers an exception to copyright infringement. 
See Nimmer, supra note 120, at 169. 
 235. See Amethyst Land Co. v. Terhune, 326 P.3d 12, 17 (N.M. 2014); 77 AM. JUR. 2D Vendor 
and Purchaser § 419 (2014) (“The ‘Shelter Rule’ provides that one who is not a bona fide purchaser, 
but who takes an interest in property from a bona fide purchaser, may be sheltered in the latter’s 
protective status.”); JONES, supra note 3, at 120 (“When a bona fide purchaser acquires the title he can, 
of course, transfer it to sub-purchasers, even if they have notice.”). 
 236. Schulte v. City of Detroit, 218 N.W. 690, 691 (Mich. 1928) (internal citations omitted). 
 237. See JOHN G. SPRANKLING, UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY LAW 407 (2012). 
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about fully protecting the good faith purchaser than it is about protecting the 
person seeking the shelter.
238
 
Understood in this vein, copyright law ought to afford good faith 
purchasers the same protection as the common law for its protection to be 
meaningful. Under the new doctrine, purchasers who buy the infringing article 
from good faith purchasers, even with actual or constructive knowledge of its 
infringing status, should acquire good title in the article. Such title in turn 
allows the purchaser to distribute it further without any liability for 
infringement. Without a shelter rule, good faith purchasers in copyright law 
would find their protection to be functionally meaningless, since few 
subsequent purchasers, if any, would be willing to buy the infringing article 
after a judicial finding of infringement. In effect, good faith purchaser 
protection would be moot without the shelter rule. 
Providing “sheltered” purchasers with immunity from infringements of 
copyright’s distribution right might once again give rise to the concern that this 
modification will come at a cost to the copyright owner’s interests. Again, 
much like with good faith purchasers, any harm that such subsequent sales 
produce for the copyright owner can be adequately quantified into the recovery 
from the manufacturer of the infringing article. This modification, much like 
the prior one, places an impetus on the copyright owner to expeditiously police 
the source of the infringement, so as to hold liable the party that is also the 
cheapest cost avoider of the harm at issue. 
* * * 
Building on the hypothetical involving Honda’s unauthorized use of 
Toyota’s protected software code in the manufacture of its cars, consider the 
following sequence of events illustrating the doctrine described above: Assume 
that between January and July 2008, Honda manufactures several Honda Civics 
containing Toyota’s code in their engine computer modules. On August 10, 
2008, Toyota commences a copyright infringement action against Honda in a 
federal district court, alleging violations of its exclusive rights of reproduction 
and distribution. A few weeks later, on August 30, 2008, during the pendency 
of the lawsuit, Joe purchases a 2008 Civic (containing the infringing content) 
from Honda, in good faith. On November 15, 2008, the federal district court 
makes a final determination of infringement against Honda, finding that it had 
copied Toyota’s code into its cars during the relevant period. On December 1, 
2008, Tony purchases a Civic from Honda, once again containing the 
infringing content. Later, on December 20, 2008, Joe sells his car to Cindy, 
who he finds on a used car website. At the time of purchase, Cindy knows of 
the lawsuit and the court’s final determination. 
 
 238. See, e.g., Hancock v. Gumm, 107 S.E. 872, 876 (Ga. 1921) (“If one with notice sell to one 
without notice, the latter is protected; or if one without notice sell to one with notice, the latter is 
protected, as otherwise a bona fide purchaser might be deprived of selling his property for full value.” 
(emphasis added) (quoting 2 GA. CIVIL CODE § 4535)). 
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Even though the cars that Honda produces during the relevant period are 
infringing articles, until the court’s formal declaration of infringement, 
Honda’s title in them is merely voidable, rather than void. As a result, when 
Joe purchases his car from Honda, he is a good faith purchaser for value. The 
transaction is one for value, and Joe has no knowledge of the infringing activity 
that taints the object, even though Toyota has commenced a lawsuit against 
Honda at the time. With no final determination, the lawsuit does not provide 
notice of infringement. Joe thus obtains good title to the car. 
This is in contrast to Tony, who purchases the car after the court’s final 
determination of infringement. The court’s finding that Honda infringed 
Toyota’s copyright in its car manufacturing serves to convert Honda’s previous 
voidable title into an altogether void title. Honda thus has no title that transfers 
to Tony under the traditional nemo dat principle. While Tony gets possession 
of the car, he has no legally recognized interest in it; as a result, he cannot 
transfer it to a third party or indeed avoid liability for infringement should he 
sell it to someone else. A consequence of Joe obtaining good title to the car as a 
good faith purchaser is that Joe can further alienate the car without incurring 
potential liability under copyright’s distribution right. Consequently, his 
subsequent transfer of the car to Cindy does not invite liability for 
infringement. Cindy in turn is protected under the shelter rule; even though she 
has actual notice of the infringing nature of the article and would therefore not 
qualify as a good faith purchaser herself, she gets the same protection and 
obtains good title to the car since her acquisition was from Joe, a good faith 
purchaser. The table below summarizes the sequence of events and their legal 
consequences. 
 
 
TABLE: EVENTS AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES UNDER THE NEW RULE 
 
Date Event Legal Consequence 
January–July 
2008 
Honda manufactures 2008 Civics 
infringing Toyota’s copyright 
Honda has voidable title in 
the 2008 Civics 
August 10, 
2008 
Toyota commences copyright 
infringement lawsuit against 
Honda 
No legal consequence 
August 30, 
2008 
Honda sells a 2008 Civic to Joe in 
a market transaction 
Joe obtains good title to 
the 2008 Civic he 
purchases 
November 15, 
2008 
Federal court finds Honda to have 
infringed Toyota’s copyright in its 
2008 Civics 
Honda’s title to all its 
2008 Civics is invalidated, 
i.e., rendered void 
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December 1, 
2008 
Honda sells a 2008 Civic to Tony 
in a market transaction 
Tony obtains no title to the 
2008 Civic under nemo 
dat 
December 20, 
2008 
Joe sells his 2008 Civic to Cindy 
in a market transaction 
Cindy obtains good title 
under the shelter rule; Joe 
is immune from liability 
 
CONCLUSION 
The persistence and gradual expansion of good faith purchaser protection 
remains one of the enduring accomplishments of the common law. Reflecting 
the common law’s commitment to free alienability and notice, as well as its 
recognition of marketplace realities, the doctrine seeks a delicate balance 
between the interests of the true owner and an innocent third party in a variety 
of domains: chattels, negotiable instruments, commercial paper, and real estate. 
Despite this reality, U.S. copyright law over the last century has offered very 
little protection for good faith purchasers of infringing articles. Good faith 
purchasers of infringing articles are instead taken to have questionable title to 
such articles, and subject to liability for reselling them on the market.
239
 
The legislative history accompanying the copyright statute reveals that 
Congress never seriously considered creating a good faith purchaser doctrine. It 
did consider—and reject—an expansive innocent seller exception on the 
understanding that such protection was superfluous and might interfere with the 
legitimate interests of copyright owners. Later courts mistakenly understood 
this rejection to imply that an innocent purchaser of an infringing article 
obtained no title in it. As a result, the idea that copyright law “rejects” good 
faith purchaser protection became commonplace, and was taken to fit with 
copyright’s analytical and normative commitments.
240
 
Yet, as I have argued here, good faith purchaser protection is essential for 
consumers of copyrighted works and, at the same time, perfectly compatible 
with copyright’s goals and objectives. Consumers of copyrighted works operate 
under the same informational restrictions and disadvantages as they do in other 
markets where good faith purchaser protection has been extended. The 
complex, standards-based system of copyright law only exacerbates this reality, 
by making it near impossible for consumers to ascertain in advance whether the 
objects that they are transacting in make unauthorized use of protected 
expression. Protecting consumers against the wrongful actions of infringing 
manufacturers by exempting their resales from liability is therefore essential. 
All the same, this need not come at the cost of copyright owners’ interests. 
Since it is the manufacturer of the infringing article that is primarily 
 
 239. See supra text accompanying notes 122–31. 
 240. See supra text accompanying notes 118–22. 
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responsible for the economic harm, copyright recovery can be simultaneously 
recalibrated in that direction with few problems. In the process, copyright 
owners and good faith purchasers will find their interests adequately protected. 
With the rejection of a natural rights-based “common law copyright” on 
both sides of the Atlantic,
241
 substantive common law is thought to provide few 
lessons, if any, that copyright law could incorporate into its utilitarian 
framework. It is perhaps for this reason that the absence of good faith purchaser 
protection in copyright law has come to be accepted as an immutable reality by 
courts, escaping scholarly attention altogether. To the extent, however, that the 
common law is understood as “nothing else but reason,”
242
 crystallized over 
ages, while remaining relevant in modern commercial settings, copyright law 
would do well here to examine whether its divergence from it is unjustifiably 
dogmatic. 
 
 241. See Donaldson v. Beckett (1774) 1 Eng. Rep. 837 (HL) 846; Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 
Pet.) 591, 682 (1834). 
 242. 1 COKE, supra note 29, at 138. 
